Three essays on law and economics by TOKAR, Steven
5 / 11 IQ //O
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
Department of Economics
i - -  _
i \ (
L l '. .
! Ill>-■»*=*■» I
Three Essays on Law and Economics
Steven Tokar
Thesis submittedfor assessment with a view to obtaining 
the degree o f  Doctor o f the European University Institute
Florence 
November 2001

jumwjiiim iiuuuui
'Mi,
¡S B B a * K J a s w » » « - —
/ ,
• f
European University Institute
3 0001 0034 8299 1
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Department of Economics
; 1
L I B
3 6 4 . 1 6 8  
TOK
Three Essays on Law and Economics
Steven Tokar
The Thesis Committee consists of:
Prof. Stephen Martin, University of Amsterdam, Co-supervisor 
" Massimo Motta, EUI, Supervisor 
" Damien Neven, University of Lausanne 
" Lars-Hendrik Roeller, Wirtschaftszentrum Berlin
frriTi'rr^ ïTf
 ^i/
wo
 o
v^
MianiMfmifirTjTinnnnWn ir1 !W*I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION 1
2 WHISTLEBLOWING AND CORPORATE CRIME 4
2.1 Introduction 4
2.2 The Mode] 6
2.3 Strategie Form 11
2.4 Analysis With Perfectly Informative Signal (a =1) 12
2.5 Comparison With Earlier Papers 14
2.6 Analysis With Imperfectly Informative Signal ( V2 <a <1) 15
2.7 Discussion 20
2.8 Model With No Fabrication Costs (t =0) 30
2.9 Discussion 32
2.10 Conclusion 36
3 OUTSIDER TRADING AND ANTITRUST ABUSES 38
3.1 Introduction 38
3.2 Legality 39
3.3 Predatory Pricing When Products Are Strategic Substitutes 44
3.4 Cartel Stability and Outsider Trading 52
3.5 Conclusion 64
A Predatory Pricing When Products Are Strategic Complements 67
A.l Standard Strategic Complements Model 67
A.2 Model With Outsider Trading 69
4 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND COMPETITION LAW BREACHES 81
4.1 Introduction 81
4.2 Theory 82
4.3 Data 85
4.4 Pre-Reprimand Analysis 88
4.5 Post-Reprimand Analysis 97
4.6 Alternative Explanations 105
4.7 Conclusions 107
5 REFERENCES 108
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis would not have been possible without the support and help of many people. 
First of all I would like to thank Massimo Motta for his excellent supervision and support. I 
am also very grateful to Stephen Martin, who was my supervisor until Massimo arrived, and 
who has played an important role throughout the writing of this Ph.D. The thesis has 
benefited greatly from his insightful comments. I am also indebted to the committee 
members Damien Neven and Lars Hendrick Roeller for their comments.
Many people also played an important role outside the working environment. Hans 
Bystrom, Gijs Kessler and Morten Rasmussen made Villino Giulia a safe harbour in the 
storms of the first year. The Scuola crew of Danny Clegg, Fredrick Langdal, Jeanette Mak, 
Ed Ramsden and Kate Taylor made the fourth year much more enjoyable. Julie Bon, Nadia 
Hashmi, Simon Hough, Rainer Kiefer and Jimmy Scully were present in every year, and 
special thanks go to them.
Finally, I would like to thank the most important people: my parents. Without their 
constant support I would never have attempted, much less finished, a Ph.D in Italy.

1. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is composed of three papers that analyse the interaction of law and economics. 
The first paper is a study of the attempts to use whistleblowers to control corporate crime. 
The paper asks which type of reward system is likely to promote welfare enhancing levels of 
whistle-blowing: large rewards will tempt more whistleblowers, but some of these may have 
fabricated the evidence in the hope of misleading the courts. The optimal level of rewards 
depends on the accuracy of the legal system, and if the legal system never makes mistakes 
then corporate crime can be eradicated. In the second paper the focus shifts from the 
individual to the firm and to opportunities for profiting in the stock market. The paper 
comes in two parts. The first investigates predation when the predator can take short 
positions in the shares of the predated firm. The second part investigates the effect of long 
and short positions in one's competitors' shares on cartel stability. In the third paper I return 
to the individuals within a law breaking firm, but this time I concentrate on the executives 
and their remuneration. The paper empirically tests whether the executives in firms that 
breached the UK competition laws were compensated for the extra risks inherent in 
breaking the law. In the rest of this introduction I describe each paper in more detail.
The paper on whistleblowing is contained in Chapter Two, and analyses the potential 
effectiveness of using employee whistleblowers to counteract corporate crime. The paper 
was inspired by the success of the False Claims Act in the US, which has led to a large 
number of firms being convicted of defrauding the government and over 4 billion dollars of 
fines have been levied. The Act contains a qui tarn system that allows individuals to file cases 
against those who have defrauded the US government, their reward being a proportion of 
any fine imposed. The paper gives a description of the Act and models the choices of the 
actors. The results show that a number of factors will be critical to the success or failure of 
the False Claims Act. Initially I follow the work of Besanko and Spulber, (1989) and assume 
that the court system is perfect, so the evidence presented in court sends a perfectly 
informative signal to the judge about the actions of the firm. Under this assumption it is 
possible to eliminate corporate crime at zero cost. This contrasts with the results of Besanko 
and Spulber (1989), who find that some positive level of crime always occurs. However, the 
assumption of no court errors is not very plausible and it is more realistic to assume that the 
signal given by the evidence in court is not perfectly informative. In this case the results are 
not clear-cut. The possible outcomes depend on the interplay of two factors: the quality of
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the court's signal and the level of the reward. If rewards are too low then the employee will 
never file, leading to the firm acting illegally as there is no chance of being prosecuted. With 
relatively un-noisy signals and sufficiently high rewards the employee will not file a case 
against a firm that has acted legally but will credibly threaten to file against a firm that acts 
illegally. The threat of being fined makes it optimal for the firm to act legally. If rewards are 
too high and the signal given by the evidence is noisy then the employee is likely to file 
cases against illegally and legally acting firms. The result of this is that the firm will act 
illegally in order to gain the benefit of the crime.
The second chapter deals with outsider trading. Outsider trading occurs when a firm trades 
in the shares of other firms when it knows that its own actions will affect the share prices of 
those other firms. An example would be the case where a supermarket was about to launch 
a price war and reduce the prices of its goods. It is likely that the announcement of this price 
war would reduce the share prices of its publicly quoted competitors. If the supermarket 
starting this price war were to take short positions in the shares of its competitors before it 
announced the strategy this would be a case of outsider trading. The decision of Halifax, a 
UK building society, to reduce the standard interest rate on its mortgages from 7.5% to 
6.75% on Tuesday 20th of March 2001 provides a real life example of an outsider trading 
opportunity. The table below gives the changes in the share prices of Halifax's main 
competitors in the two days following the announcement:
Table 1.1
Share Price Changes in March 2001
Company Opening Price 20/2/01 Closing Price llp JO l % Change
Abbey National 1173 1114 -5.02
Alliance and Leicester 709 675 -4.79
Barclays 2308 2214 -4.04
Bradford and Bingley 300.75 296 -1.58
HSBC 1056 1034 -2.08
LIoyds-TSB 670.5 637 -5.00
Royal Bank of Scotland 1703 1532 -10.04
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As one can see, were Halifax to have taken a short position in the shares of its competitors, 
and or bought some puts, it could have profited handsomely* The paper discusses the 
strategic value of these outsider trading opportunities and the results show that the role of 
these outsider trading opportunities is similar to the role of capacity investment in Dixit 
(1980), in that outsider trading shifts the reaction function of the trading firm. Dixit (1980) 
studies entry deterrence; here I study predation and cartel stability. In the predation model I 
show how the ability of a predator to take a short position in the shares of the target firm can 
lead to the predator overcoming the standard commitment problem. The predator's gain 
from the fall in the target's share price makes the predator's threats credible and rational. 
Under certain conditions the equilibrium results in the target firm exiting the market as soon 
as it learns of the predation strategy. However, the results are heavily affected by the 
whether the products are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The second half of 
the paper deals with the stability of cartels when cartel members can trade in the shares of 
their competitors. The results show that the outsider trading always makes cartels less 
stable. Various potential explanations for these results are discussed.
Chapter Four contains a paper that investigates firms that broke the UK competition laws 
and specifically the remuneration of the executives in those firms. The hypotheses tested 
centre around whether these executives received higher remuneration to compensate them 
for the risks involved in breaking the law. The results show that both the highest paid 
executive and the board of directors in firms that broke the law received significantly higher 
remuneration than a comparison sample. Similar tests were run on a sample of firms after 
they were reprimanded, when they are presumed to be no longer breaking the law. These 
results are less conclusive. While the highest paid directors did not receive higher 
remuneration total board remuneration was still significantly higher in the firms that were 
previously reprimanded.
rtiinniirtiiwii)
2. WHISTLEBLOWING AND CORPORATE CRIME
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter I analyse the potential effectiveness of using employee whistleblowers to 
counteract corporate crime. This is the system employed by the False Gaims Act 1986 (USC 
31 § 3729-3733). The Act allows individuals to take anyone to court if they are making false 
claims against the government, with the reward being a share of any fine imposed on the 
indicted party. The use of rewards differentiates the legislation from other whistleblower 
laws. These other statutes, like the US Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and the US 
Whistleblower Act of 1989, only attempt to protect the whistleblower from harassment and 
revenge attacks.1
The legal process is quite intricate and begins when an individual or individuals, henceforth 
called the relator, files a complaint against a firm 'in  camera'. This means that the complaint 
is not immediately served upon the firm, in this case for at least 60 days. In this time the 
relator remains anonymous and the Department of Justice (DoJ) must investigate the 
complaint The complaint will contain information about an alleged fraud against the US 
government and will implicate some parties. After investigating the DoJ decides on a course 
of action. It has four options: dismiss the case, offer to settle the case out of court, allow the 
relator to proceed alone, or intervene and go to court.
If the DoJ intervenes then it takes primary responsibility for the prosecution and the relator 
remains as a party to the case. The case then proceeds as a normal fraud investigation. In 
this instance the relator receives between 15% and 25% of any successful recovery. The exact 
percentage is decided by the judge and depends on the contribution of the relator to the 
successful prosecution of the case.
If the government does not intervene the relator is solely responsible for the prosecution of 
the case and must bear all the prosecution costs. If the relator wins the case without the aid
The use of rewards also differentiates the legislation from 'gatekeeper legislation’. Gatekeeper legislation imposes 
liabilities on those parties whose cooperation is necessary for fraud to succeed. Requirements of this type are in the 
US Securities Act of 1933 §11 of this statute forces the parties involved in the sponsoring of a public share offering 
to reasonably investigate the validity of the new firm. See Kraakman (1986).
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of the DoJ then the relator is awarded between 25% and 30% of the damages paid by the 
defendant.
Apart from legal costs, the other major cost of filing a qui tam suit is the possibility of 
dismissal. Since the employee may fear retaliation if they file a qui tam suit against their 
employer there are specific protective measures contained in the Act. Section 3730(h) 
attempts to protect whistleblowers from retaliation, promising twice the amount of lost pay, 
compensation, and reimbursement of any legal fees expended when suing the firm under § 
3730(h).
While the laws that attempt to solely protect whistleblowers from retribution have had little 
success in increasing the amount of fraud reported the False Claims act has, ostensibly, been 
very successful.2 It seems to be an expedient way of combating crime in areas where 
detection is difficult. Detection problems are especially prominent in the area of fraud 
against the US government, where it is impossible for the auditors to cross check every 
Medicaid or Medicare invoice. In contrast, it is likely that the employee filling out the form 
knows whether the claim is fraudulent. If the employee can be induced to truthfully reveal 
when the company is defrauding the government then it would appear that the False Claims 
Act is the perfect system for stamping out fraud. Is this the case? The False Claims Act raises 
two main questions:
1. Will employees actually file when they discover a fraudulent claim?
2. If they do file will they only file against firms which have actually committed fraud? 
Or will they invent claims in the hope of obtaining judicial rewards?
The model presented here shows that a number of factors will be critical to the success or 
failure of the False Claims Act. Firstly, if the court system is perfect and the evidence 
presented in court sends a perfectly informative signal to the judge about the actions of the 
firm then it is possible to eliminate fraud at zero cost. Unfortunately, this is not very 
plausible and a more realistic assumption is that the signal given by the evidence in court is 
not perfectly informative. In this case the results are not clear cu t The possible outcomes
Qui tam recoveries exceed $4,174 billion, with over 3,526 qui tam cases filed since the False Claims Act was 
amended in 1986. Source: Taxpayers Against Fraud Website: http://vrvvTv.taf.org/ Consulted October 2001.
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depend on the interplay of two factors: the quality of the court's signal and the level of the  
reward. If rewards are too low then the employee will never file, leading to the firm acting 
illegally as there is no chance of being prosecuted. With relatively un-noisy signals and  
sufficiently high rewards it is possible to deter firms from committing fraud. The employee 
will not file a case against a firm which has acted legally but will credibly threaten to file 
against a firm which acts illegally. The threat of being fined makes it optimal for the firm to  
act legally. If rewards are too high and the signal given by the evidence is noisy then the  
employee is likely to file against illegally and legally acting firms. The result of this is that 
the firm will act illegally in order to gain the benefit of the fraud.
In studying the area of delegated monitoring and whistleblowing this paper is similar to the  
work of Instefjord et al. (1998). They model the internal structure of the firm as a monitoring 
chain and show that raising the payoffs to whistleblowers can reduce the amount of fraud in 
a firm. The main difference between their paper and this one is that they discuss only 
internal monitoring and concentrate on the whether ex ante or ex post regulatory activity is 
superior. Another related paper is that of Motta and Polo (1999). They study the problem of 
trying to entice a firm to admit that it was part of a cartel, analysing leniency policies that 
give fine reductions for admitting guilt. Their focus is on the incentives for the entire firm to 
whistleblow rather than the incentives for the employee.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section two describes the model. Section three 
discusses the results and the equilibria that are possible. The results for a restricted version 
of the model where the costs of fabricating evidence are set to zero are presented in section 
four. The conclusion ends the paper.
2.2. The Model
The model described below is a dynamic game of imperfect information. The game has three 
players: the firm; the employee; and the judge.3 All players wish to maximise their expected 
payoff and are risk neutral. The structure of the game, the payoffs and the players' 
rationality are all common knowledge. The extensive form of the game is shown in Figure 
One.
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Figure One
EXTENSIVE FORM OF MODEL
FIRM
EMPLOYEE EMPLOYEE
The possible interjection of the Department of Justice is not included as it only complicates the model and leaves 
the main results unchanged.
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The timing of the game is as follows.
1. The firm chooses whether to commit the fraud or not. If the firm acts illegally then it 
obtains a return of n . The profits from acting legally are standardised to zero. I use  
the term fraud here in order to lend some specificity to the description and because it 
is the standard case under the False Claims Act. The model can be thought of as  
covering any type of corporate crime.
2. The employee then decides whether to file a case against the firm or remain silent. 
The employee's information sets are singletons, the employee knows whether the  
firm committed the crime or not. If the employee remains silent his payoff is zero -  
irrespective of whether the firm acted illegally or legally. If the employee decides to  
file a case he must pay a cost C > 0. The most obvious cost of filing a case is attorney's 
fees, although standard practice is to enter into a contingency fee agreement where  
legal fees are only paid if the case is won.
Since the standard False Claims Act case is the employee filing a case against his 
employer, the other major cost is the possibility of dismissal. In order to try and  
prevent retaliation the Act contains a clause protecting whistleblowers. Although 
this clause promises twice back pay and compensation there is still legal debate 
within the US court system as to the applicability of this clause. If, as is likely, the 
relator is dismissed then he must estimate the present value of lost income, 
discounting at an appropriate rate and factoring in the possibility of promotion and  
or periods of unemployment Although these costs will be incurred in the future, 
they are a direct consequence of the decision to file a case, and the change in 
expected income occurs when the relator decides to file the case. In sum, it is clear 
that there a strictly positive cost is incurred when the relator files a qui tam case.
In addition to the costs of filing, if the firm is innocent the employee incurs a cost of t 
> 0 when fabricating the evidence against the firm. This cost relates to the time and 
effort spent fabricating the evidence, as opposed to just collecting the evidence in the 
firm, t can also be thought of as the increased risk of a fee-shifting judgement. Section 
3730(d)(4) of the Act states:
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"If the government does not proceed with the action and the person 
bringing the action conducts the action, the court may award to the 
defendant its reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses if the defendant 
prevails in the action and the court finds that the claim of the person 
bringing the act was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought 
primarily for purposes of harassment."
Therefore part of t can be thought of as the increased probability (increased w.r.t. 
bringing a genuine case) of having to pay the legal fees of the firm.
While the costs of filing the case are certain, the positive returns are not guaranteed. 
The employee will only receive a proportion 0 < b  < 1 of the fine F (F > H;.4 if the 
judge condemns the firm. In reality the level of b will depend on the relator's 
contribution to the case, and is decided upon by the judge. Here one can think of b as 
the proportion of the fine the relator expects to receive. With regard to the fine F, the 
legislation lays out the exact rules for calculating the fine. Section 3729(a)(7) states 
that the defendant:
"is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not 
less that $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of 
damages which the Government sustains..."
Given the relator knows about the crime it is reasonable to assume that the value of F 
is also known to the employee.
3. If the employee files a case the next move is that of nature. The move of nature 
represents all the evidence that appears in court. The evidence comes from the firm 
and the relator, but could also come from other sources such as police reports or 
government investigations. The evidence presented to the judge gives her a signal 
about the guilt or innocence of the firm. The signal can take on two discrete 
outcomes, s e  {g ti} Here g means that the evidence points to the firm being guilty, 
i.e. it acted illegally, and i means that the evidence points to the firm being innocent,
4 VMien U > F  the firm will always act illegally. This case is not interesting so I ignore it.
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i.e. the firm played legal. This signal is assumed to be informative but not perfectly 
informative and the signal is correct with a probability of a, 1 > a  > V2. For example, 
if the firm chose illegal then s = g  with probability a  and s = i with probability [1-aj. 
The judge uses this signal to update her beliefs about the guilt or innocence of the 
firm. She is not bound by it, even if the signal is s = i her best response may still be to 
condemn the firm.
4. The final move is that of the judge. The judge has imperfect information about the 
move of the firm. The judge cannot observe the move of the firm and therefore 
updates her beliefs about which node she is at using Bayes' Rule. The judge's tw o  
information sets represent the result of the court signal: guilty or innocent The judge 
receives the signal about whether the firm is guilty or innocent but is not able to tell 
with certainty whether the firm actually committed the crime or not. The judge has 
two possible moves at every node: she can condemn or acquit die firm. If the judge 
condemns the firm then the firm is fined F and the employee receives a proportion of 
the fine. If the judge's move is acquit then the firm is not fined and the employee 
receives no reward. The four possible outcomes are condemning a firm that acted 
illegally, condemning a firm that acted legally, acquitting a firm that acted illegally 
and acquitting a firm that acted legally. I assign the following utilities: if the judge is 
correct, i.e. she condemns a firm which acted illegally or acquits a firm which acted 
legally, then she receives a payoff of 1 if the judge gives the wrong verdict she 
receives -l.5 The use of judge utilities makes the standard of guilt endogenous in the 
model. The general equation used for calculating the level of belief necessary to 
convict the accused is:
U[L + U LaE + U ^ - U raL
Where U^E refers to the utility of acquitting a firm which acted legally and U f  refers 
to the utility of condemning a firm which acted illegally, etc. Substituting the values
5 The subject of the utility of these outcomes has been heavily debated in the literature. See: Andreoni (1991), 
Connolly (1987) Kaplan (1968), Milanich (1981) and Tribe (1971). In any case the results are not dependent on this 
assumption.
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above gives p  — 0.5 In civil law the standard of proof is deemed to be a 
'preponderance of the evidence’ and it is generally acknowledged that this is equal to 
0.5. Whichever party offers the most convincing case, i.e. which of the versions 
presented seems closer to the truth, wins. In the model I adopt this standard and the 
judge will play a pure strategy of convict if her updated Bayesian belief that the firm 
acted illegally is strictly larger than 0.5.
2.3. Strategic Form
The payoff structure is given in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 
Payoff Table
Node Firm Payoff Relator Payoff Judge Payoff
1 U - F b F - c 1
2 n - C -1
3 n - F b F - c 1
4 n - C -1
5 n 0 0
6 - F b F - C - t - 1
7 0 - C - t 1
8 - F b F - C - t - 1
9 0 - C - t 1
10 0 0 0
Given this structure the solution concept chosen to solve the game is sequential equilibrium, 
as promoted by Kreps and Wilson (1982). In many cases in this model the requirements for 
sequential equilibria are identical to those imposed by weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
The extra restriction imposed by the sequential equilibrium concept concern beliefs at nodes 
which are off the equilibrium path, i.e. nodes which are reached with zero probability in 
equilibrium. By using sequential equilibrium instead of weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium I 
restrict the possible strategies of the judge when her decision nodes are not reached. These
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restrictions mean that the set of sequential equilibria is a subset of the set of weak perfect 
Bayesian equilibria.
There is no unique solution to this game. Under some parameter conditions there are unique 
equilibria, but there are also cases when a set of parameter values leads to a number of 
different possible equilibria. In these cases it is difficult to predict what the outcome of the  
game would be.
The method followed to obtain the equilibria was as follows. First, I selected a set of beliefs 
for the judge, e.g. jiG and }i\ >lh . From this one obtains the best responses of the judge  
and one can then move up the tree and obtain the optimal strategies for the employee and  
the firm. Once all the best replies are calculated it possible to re-derive the judge's beliefs to  
see if they are compatible with the initial choice. If they are then the beliefs and strategies are  
a sequential equilibrium.
Before diving into the main model I solve for the case of a  = 1. This is the situation where the 
evidence presented in court gives a perfect signal about whether the firm acted illegally or  
not. Although perhaps unrealistic it serves for expositional purposes and as a benchmark for 
the standard model. Furthermore, a  = 1 means that the firm's actions are verifiable 
information. This allows a direct comparison with earlier papers using this assumption, in 
particular the papers of Besanko & Spulber (1989) and Martini (1995). They tackle the 
problem of collusion, but collusion can be thought of as one of the corporate crimes covered 
by this paper. All that is needed is the assumption that the action is illegal and that it gives 
some benefit to the firm.
2.4. Analysis With Perfectly Informative Signal (a  = 1)
Proposition - If b F  > C then the unique sequential equilibrium is for the firm to play legal 
and the employee to play not file if the firm acted legally. 6 The employee credibly threatens 
to file if the firm plays illegal. Furthermore, for a sequential equilibrium we must specify the 
beliefs of the judge and which actions she will take even though her nodes are off the
Technically, sequential equilibrium is not defined for this degenerate case of the model since when calculating 
consistency of beliefs one should also consider the moves of nature as containing errors. This slight lack of 
formality does not affect the results.
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equilibrium path. With a  = 1 her beliefs are pc “  1 and pi = 0, leading her to condemn on a 
guilty signal and acquit on an innocent signal. The equilibrium can be described in the 
following way:
I-mV
$
ii*;
i
H'i
r('{
(p ~ 0, Tj = \, y = 0, p ~ 0, c  = pG = 1, p} = 0
Where:
is the probability that the firm acts illegally.
tj is the probability that the employee files given that the firm acted illegally.
y is the probability that the employee files given that the firm acted legally.
p  is the probability that the judge condemns on a guilty signal.
<7 is the probability that the judge condemns on an innocent signal.
p G is the probability of being at the left hand node of the guilty signal information set
p t is the probability of being at the left hand node of the innocent signal information set.
Proof - As is normal, we start at the bottom of the tree and work our way up. With a = 1 the 
beliefs of the judge are trivial. Given that the signal from the evidence is perfectly 
informative the judge will always condemn on a guilty signal and acquit on an innocent 
signal. With this decided one can now move up the tree to the decision nodes of the 
employee. If the firm chose illegal then the employee is choosing between a payoff of 
b F - C  and zero. By assumption b F - C >  0 so the employee's best response is to file. If the 
firm acted legally then the employee is choosing between - C  — t and zero (the firm will be 
acquitted so there will be no reward). The employee's optimal response is therefore not to 
file a case against a firm that acted legally.
We can now move up to the initial node of the firm. The firm chooses between legal, which 
leads to a payoff of FI -  F  and illegal, which leads to a payoff of zero. Given the parameter 
conditions it is optimal for the firm to choose legal. ■
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Proposition 2 If bF < C  then the unique sequential equilibrium is for the firm to choose  
illegal and the employee not to file whatever the firm does. As before ¡iG = 1 and f i j — 0 .
The judge will condemn on a guilty signal and acquit on an innocent signal. The equilibrium  
can be described in the following way:
p =  l,77 = 0 ,y  = 0 ,p  = l,cr = 0, / rc = 1 , ^ = 0
Proof The proof follows the same lines as the one given above. The only difference is th at  
the reward b F  is too small to entice the employee to file. With no one filing it is optimal fo r  
the firm to act illegally.«
The results above show that the use of quit tam suits allows us to obtain the first b est  
equilibrium of no illegality providing two conditions are m et first, the signal given by the  
court is perfectly informative about whether the firm acted legally or illegally; second, the  
rewards are large enough to entice relators to file.
2.5. Comparison With Earlier Papers
This result differs from that of Besanko & Spulber (1989) and Martini (1995). In both of these 
papers the results obtained show that allowing some collusion is optimal.
In Besanko & Spulber (1989) a small degree of collusion is optimal because it saves 
enforcement costs and stops more serious levels of collusion (Proposition Two in their 
paper). In Martini (1995) a little collusion results from the lack of pure strategy equilibria 
when legal costs are low (Proposition Two in his paper). A  pure strategy of prosecute would  
lead to total deterrence but would waste legal fees as the firms would never collude. The 
unique equilibrium exists when the authority and the firm play mixed strategies, thus 
implying some strictly positive level of collusion in equilibrium.
In these two previous models full eradication of collusion is therefore not optimal. In the 
model studied here full eradication of fraud (collusion) is possible and optimal (if one 
assumes that zero corporate crime is optimal). The different result here comes from the fact 
that in this model when the employee makes the decision to prosecute the employee knows 
whether the firm acted illegally or not. In both the other models when the authorities make 
the decision to prosecute they are still unaware of whether the firm acted illegally or legally.
14
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In Besanko & Spulber the authority prosecutes because it is carrying out the strategy it pre- 
committed to* In Martini the decision to prosecute is taken after the firm has committed the 
crime but when the authority is still unaware of whether the firm acted illegally or not. The 
use of relators allows this Gordian Knot to be cut and leads to the prosecution of only those 
firms which acted illegally. Full deterrence is thus optimal and possible when the signal of 
the court system is perfectly informative (when a = 1) and the qui tarn payoffs are high 
enough to entice employees to file (whenbF > C ).
2.6. Analysis With Imperfectly Informative Signal (Vz < a  < 1)
In this section I discuss the results of the main model where the signal given by the court 
system is not perfectly informative (V2 < a  < 1). But before I do this I detail the proof for an 
equilibrium. The equilibrium chosen corresponds to that of equilibrium one, the correct 
filing equilibrium. The proofs for the other equilibria are similar and so I omit them.
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium One, correct filing equilibrium)
Under the parameter conditions
C < b f < C  + t,S* 0> Y
[1 ~<PnY
00 *8j >
a
1 - a
the following is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium. 
Beliefs: fiG > ^ '¿ * 1  >
Strategies: <p = 0, t/ = 1, y = 0, p  = l, <7 = 1
Proof In this equilibrium the firm acts legally. The employee will file against a firm that has 
acted illegally but not against a firm that has acted legally. The judge condemns on a guilty 
signal and condemns on an innocent signal. This is an equilibrium where the system works 
correctly. Employees only file against firms that have acted illegally and the threat of this is 
enough to make acting legally a best response for the firm.
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Firm: in this equilibrium the firm knows that if it acts illegally the employee will file and it 
will be condemned in court. Conversely, if the firm acts legally the employee will not file. 
The firm is therefore choosing between acting illegally, which gives I I - F  and legally, 
which gives 0. Since II < F  the best response is to act legally.
Employee: the employee of an illegal firm is choosing between bF  -  C and 0 ,  as he know s  
that the firm will be condemned if he files the case. With the above conditions on th e  
parameters filing is a best response.
The employee of a legal firm faces b F - C - t  and 0 ,  as again he knows that the firm will b e  
condemned in court and he will receive the reward. However, for the employee of a firm  
which has acted legally the sum of the filing costs and the fabrication costs is too high to  
make filing a best response; the decision not to file is the optimal strategy.
Judge: in this equilibrium the judge's information sets are off the equilibrium path so Bayes' 
rule is not very helpful. In order to test whether the equilibrium is sequential we adjust th e  
pure strategies so that they contain errors. The addition of these errors means that th e  
strategies are now completely mixed and there is therefore a strictly positive probability of  
reaching every node. Testing whether an equilibrium is sequential then involves testing th at  
the strategies are best responses as these errors go to zero and hence the probability o f  
reaching some nodes goes to zero.
For this potential equilibrium the pure strategies of the firm and the employee are  
<p = 0, rj = \ and y = 0. The errors are incorporated by taking three sequences which
converge to the pure strategies: (pn — —-  >0, rjn — n_^ o ->1, and yn — >0 respectively.
The optimality of the judge's decision is then tested as n —> oo and these mixed strategies 
converge to their pure counterparts.
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In order for a pure strategy of condemn to be optimal at the guilty signal information set fjnc 
has to converge to a number greater than one half.7 This is equivalent to the following 
condition:
8 1 -
<P 77
[1 -<pnv
------>SG > l - a
a
There is a similar equation for the judge’s updated Bayesian beliefs when the signal is 
innocent. The condition at the innocent information set is:
V>
;; f :i S
s -------------->â. > - ^ -
[1 -<pn]yn l - a
From a > Vz it follows that _£L_ > . The tighter condition is therefore the one at the
l - a  a
innocent signal information set. Fulfilling the innocent signal condition is a sufficient 
condition for fulfilling the guilty signal condition.
The beliefs in a sequential equilibrium only have to be consistent for one sequence of strictly 
mixed strategy profiles, sequential equilibrium places no restrictions on the set of sequences. 
As long as it is possible to find a set of sequences for which the above conditions hold we 
can claim that this is a sequential equilibrium. For instance, if we were to choose
(pn = —, 77" =  1—— and y n
n n n
Then
- P - - ]§ n = _n------ n_
n n
11—KO -»co >
a
l - a
In order for a mixed strategy to be optimal, given a guilty signal, the condition has to hold with equality, i.e. p c  
V2. I deem this too restrictive an assumption on the sequences and I therefore ignore all equilibria with the judge 
playing a mixed strategy at her off the equilibrium path nodes. For the purposes of this paper they are called 
'unreasonable beliefs'
: : :  s
ni
i
* : :1. : ¡1
: i
.  V•.if
* ' » - Jir - >1
{:.* 
; I
t '■ s
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So the condition holds.«
The other four pure strategy equilibria are described below. 
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium Two, rewards too high equilibrium) 
Under the parameter conditions:
bF > C + 1
the following is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium.
Beliefs: fiG > ^ , /r, >
Strategies: =  1, 7  = 1, y = 1, /? = 1, o- = 1
Proof As equilibrium one.«
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium Three, rewards too low equilibrium) 
Under the parameter conditions:
c<bf,s;
[1 -cp’Y  1 -a
the following is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium.
Beliefs: f iG >  ^
Strategies: <p =  1,77 = 0, y s= 0, p  = 1, cr = 1 
Proof As equilibrium one.«
Proposition 6 (Equilibrium Four, signal dependent, correct filing equilibrium)
Under the parameter conditions:
aabF>C, bF[l -a \<C + t, a >
s ’c = 9 "n- ---------- >•<?<->— , s ; = —^ - —
[1 -<p"]r’ a  [1 -<p"]y"
the following is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium.
Beliefs: fic > ^  / Mi < Y 2
n—wc < --------l - a
Strategies: <p = 0, 77 = 1, y = 0, p  = l, cr = 0 
Proof As equilibrium one.«
Proposition 7 (Equilibrium Five,, signal dependent, no-one filing equilibrium) 
Under the parameter conditions:
a b F > C ,
° [1 ~9"\Y
1 — (x
->s0 > — , S’
a
the following is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium.
Beliefs:
— ----------------->5, < -------
[ 1 7 l - a
Strategies: <p = \, 7  = 0, y = 0, p  = 1, cr = 0
Proof As equilibrium one.«
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2.7. Discussion
I concentrate on the description of the five pure strategy equilibria described above.8
These five pure strategy equilibria are shown on the following diagram.
Figure Two 
RESULTS WITH t >  0
EQ U ILIBRIU M  ONE; employ«« cmly file« agiiret films w H ch act illegally; judg« condemn* o n b o th  signals 
and firm acts legally.
EQ U ILIBRIU M  TW O; e m p lo y e  files against firms w hich ac t illegally  and legally; judge condemns o n b o th  
signals and firm  acts illegally.
EQ U ILIBRIU M  TH R EE: employee t u r n  files; judge would condemn on both  j  ignals and firm acts illegally. 
EQ U ILIBRIU M  FOUR: employee only files against firms which act illegally; judge condemns o n  guilty signal 
and acquits on  innocent s ignal; firm  acts legally.
EQ U ILIBRIU M  FTVE: employee never files; judge would condemn on  guilty signal and acquit a n  an innocent 
signal; firm acts illegally.
F  «  ^  *  -
A R R O W  O N E; up to the line Jjj, the employee w ill not file i f  the firm acted legally.
F «  —
A RR O W  TW O : above the line ^  a  the employee w ill file i f  the firm  acts illegally.
* Some mixed equilibria with reasonable beliefs do exist. These can be split into two groups. The first set consists of 
those where bF  — C , bF  — C + 1 or CcbF — C . In these cases the employee plays a mixed strategy and the 
results are a combination of the pure strategy equilibria. The other set involves the firm playing a precise mixed  
strategy and the judge playing a pure strategy on one signal and mixed on the other. All the equilibria in this third 
group can be located above the line  ^_ C + z . I ignore these, as equilibrium two seems much more intuitive.
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Equilibrium one (correct filing) is the band where the parameters fulfil C<bF <C + t . In
this area, between the lines denoted p - c+t and f = — it is possible to eliminate corporate
crime. Equilibrium one (correct filing) is the pure strategy separating equilibrium in this 
area. Here the firm knows that if it acts illegally the employee will file and this will lead to 
the firm being fined. Acting legally will give a payoff of zero, and since F  > 17 acting legally 
is the best response.
For the employee of a firm which has acted illegally the choice is between bF - C  and 0 . In 
this area of the diagram bF >C  so filing is the best response. For the parameter values in 
the equilibrium one area not filing is the best response for the employee of a firm which has 
acted legally as the qui tam payoff is not large enough to cover the costs of fabricating the 
evidence and filing the case. Note that the employee of a firm which acted legally knows 
that the firm will be condemned, it is not fear of the firm being acquitted that stops him from 
filing, he does not file because the reward is too small.
The judge's decision nodes are off the equilibrium path, but the conditions required for the 
judge to condemn at both information sets are still pc  > Vi and fj\ > V2. Loosely speaking this 
can be thought of as a condition on the probability of strategy errors and in this equilibrium 
the condition is that the firm is more likely to play illegal by mistake than the employee of a 
legal firm is to file by mistake.9
If the rewards are too high then the equilibrium strategy of the employee is to file, regardless 
of the firm's strategy. The rewards for filing are such that it is optimal for the employee to 
fabricate the evidence and take firms to court even when they are acting legally. In this 
equilibrium, equilibrium two (rewards too high), the firm is choosing between a payoff of 
n - F  and —F.  Whatever it does the firm will be taken to court and condemned so the 
optimal strategy is to act illegally, as by doing this the firm at least gains the extra illegal 
profits n . Equilibrium two is a pooling equilibrium, as the employee performs the same 
action whether the firm acted legally or illegally. The judge's best response in this 
equilibrium is to play a pure strategy of condemn at both information sets as she knows that 
the firm's optimal strategy is to act illegally.
9 The judge's off the equilibrium path beliefs are discussed in detail later in the paper.
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If rewards are too low then the optimal strategy of the employee is never to file a qui tarn 
case, even if the firm has acted illegally. If the employee never files it is optimal for the firm  
to act illegally, as it knows it will never be taken to court. Equilibrium three (rewards to o  
low) is a pure strategy equilibrium in this area. Again this is a pooling equilibrium as th e  
employee takes the same action in equilibrium, regardless of whether the firm acted legally  
or illegally. As before the judge condemns at both information sets.
The other two pure strategy equilibria depend more explicitly on the value of a, i.e a  en ters
into more than the sequence conditions. Exactly placing equilibria four (signal dependent,
correct filing) and five (signal dependent, no-one filing) on Figure Two is not possible. In th e
figure the lines representing the boundaries of equilibria four and five /•=-£. and r  _ C+t
ba b{\-a]
are drawn for a specific chosen value of a.
In equilibrium four we have the pure strategy equilibrium that one may have hoped for.10 In  
this case the judge condemns on a guilty signal and acquits on an innocent signal. T h e  
employee will file a case if the firm acted illegally and will not file if the firm acted legally. If 
the firm acts illegally it knows that it will be condemned in court with a probability a  an d  
this is high enough to make acting legally the firm's best response.
What is interesting about equilibrium four (signal dependent, correct filing) is that the  
judge's information sets are not reached but the judge plays different strategies at each  
information set. This gives an opportunity to discuss in more depth the beliefs of the judge 
when her decision nodes are off the equilibrium path.
10 The drawing of equilibrium four in Figure Two includes the additional implicit assumption that a  >  I J / F . Triple 
damages and the fact that a  > Vz makes this a relatively easy assumption to fulfil. If a < IT/F then equilibrium 
four no longer exists.
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Figu re  Three
The effect of a, on the probability boundaries.
1 -  a  
a
a
\ - a
0
Figure Three above shows the two parameter conditions that have to be fulfilled by tire
sequences when we are dealing with off the equilibrium path beliefs. The scale goes from
zero on the left to infinity on the right. The right hand condition is . Since Vi < a  < 1 this
1 -a
implies that j < _ £ _ <00, furthermore, the derivative is - These two facts imply
\-a da a 2
that as a  goes from V2 to one, — - goes from one to infinity.
\-a
The second parameter condition, which floats in the area between zero and one, is i l £ . It is
a
restricted to be between zero and one because a is restricted to be between V2 and one. This
time the derivative is _ zL  < 0 , so as a  increases the value of this function decreases.
da a 2
The optimal strategies of the judge depend on where the sequences converge to. In this 
equilibrium, equilibrium four, in order for convicting on a guilty signal to be a best response 
the following condition, which is derived from fie > V2, has to be satisfied:
9  7
[ l - p * ] r *
Jl * s e >
\ — CC
a
The three sequences converge, for this equilibrium, as follows: 
q f —  _ >0, 77" — -^ -—>1,and y n— n_>oo >0 . Relating this to Figure Three, what this
condition says is that the convergence point of this sequence has to be a value to the right of
At the innocent signal information set the judge acquits the firm. The restriction that ^ n .< V 2 
furnishes
<p n
[i ~ 9 " V
* 5 ; < a
1 - a
This implies that the convergence point of the sequence has to be to the left of ~a - .  S in ce
1 - a
- a  > l~ g it is possible to find sequences that fit this condition. If we were to chose 
l-a  a
< p '= -,T )’ = 1 - -  and y" = -  
n n n
Then
- c i - - ]
S ’  = —  - r j - = 1 and
n n
l - a  , a
----- <1 < ------
a  l - a
How much faith we are willing to put in this sequential equilibrium depends on the size o f  
the space between these two conditions, the larger the space the more faith one should h a v e  
in this equilibrium. More intuitively, if the signal given by the court system is almost p erfect  
then the judge will follow the signal and acquit on an innocent signal and condemn on  a  
guilty signal. Note that as a  increases the lower bound j decreases, making it easier to
fulfil, simultaneously as a  increases the upper bound  ^ heads to infinity, making it to o  
easier to fulfil.
The conditions for this equilibrium can be compared to the conditions for equilibrium o n e  
(correct filing). The conditions on the qui tam payment in equilibrium one a re  
C < b F  < C  + t . In equilibrium four the payment conditions are abF > C a n d  
[l-a^f)F < C  + t . Figure Two shows that there is some overlap here and there are som e  
parameter values when the reward conditions for equilibria one and four will be fulfilled 
simultaneously. The difference to contemplate is therefore the difference in the beliefs of the  
judge. In equilibrium one the judge condemns on both signals, in four she condemns on a
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guilty signal and acquits on an innocent signal. For the judge to condemn and acquit on both 
an innocent and a guilty signal the sufficient and necessary condition is:
( ? ; = _ p V
[i
+dj > a
1 - a
On Figure Three this is represented by the values between a and infinity. Whether one
l - a
thinks that equilibrium one or four is more plausible depends on the value assigned to a; If
a  is large then the gap between —q and — q will be large and it seems more plausible to
1 -a  a
say that equilibrium four is the one to concentrate on. Furthermore, as a  approaches one it 
also become easier to fulfil the conditions abF > C and [1—cr] < C + 1. Non-technically, as 
a  increases the expected payoff from filing against illegal firms increases but the expected 
payoff from filing against legal firms decreases. It is thus more likely that the result will be a 
separating equilibrium where only the employee of the illegal firm will file a case.
As was shown earlier the limit case of this is when a  = I. This is when the signal given by 
the evidence in court is perfectly informative and the judge always acquits on an innocent 
signal and always condemns on a guilty signal. In this case equilibrium one disappears as it 
impossible to find sequences which converge to a value which is strictly greater than
infinity. Simultaneously the gap between a  and I b e c o m e s  the gap between infinity
1 - a  a
and zero and it is impossible, given that t] q [0,1], y e [0,1] and <p e [0,1] to find a sequence 
which converges to a point outside this range. The only beliefs which fulfil the conditions 
imposed by sequential equilibrium are p c > V2 and pi < lh. So the judge’s optimal strategies 
are p  = 1 and <j  = 0 : condemn on a guilty signal and acquit on an innocent signal.
The actions of the judge in the last pure strategy equilibrium, equilibrium five (signal 
dependent, no-one filing), also involve the judge acquitting on an innocent signal and 
condemning on a guilty signal. In this respect it is like equilibrium four, but the payoff 
conditions are similar to equilibrium three (rewards too low) as the rewards to filing are not 
high enough to entice the employee to file. However, when discussing the beliefs in 
equilibria four (signal dependent, correct filing) and five one has to be careful about the 
sequence conditions. It is not possible to make a direct comparison between equilibria five
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and four, as the limit points of the individual sequences are different In equilibrium four th e  
sequences must converge as follows:
(pn---------->0 , 77" ---------- >1 and y n---------- »0* * i n-^ oe * jv-m
Where as in equilibrium five the sequences are as follows:
(pn— -  - >1, T}n---------- >0 and y * —  >1' fl-no ’ • b—»oo • n—ho
The difference here is in the strategies of the firm and the employee of a firm that has a c te d  
illegally. In equilibrium four (signal dependent, correct filing) the employee will file if th e  
firm acts illegally, while this is not the case in equilibrium five where the rewards are to o  
low. It is therefore not possible to directly compare the off the equilibrium path beliefs  
because, as was stated before, the convergence points of the individual sequences a r e  
different. It is therefore impossible to claim that one is more realistic than the other.
Two equilibria which are comparable in this respect are equilibria three (rewards too low  )  
and five (signal dependent, no-one filing). Both of these have the same pure strategies of th e  
employee and the firm. Their only difference is in the beliefs of the judge. In equilibrium  
three the judge condemns on both signals and in equilibrium five she condemns on a guilty  
signal and acquits on an innocent signal. Like before which of these is more plausible 
depends on the value of a. As a  increases equilibrium five becomes more plausible as o n e  
has to put more and more restrictions on the sequences to get a result that fulfils
--------------- >S / > - 2 -
' [l-<E>"]r 1 - a
In other words, it becomes less realistic that the judge will condemn on an innocent signal, 
as she does in equilibrium three.
2.7.1. Employee Best Responses
With multiple equilibria it is not always clear what the best response of the employee will 
be, as for some parameter conditions the employee's best responses differ according to the 
equilibrium chosen. More encouragingly, for some parameter conditions the employee’s best
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response is independent of the equilibria. In these cases we can make definite predictions 
about the efficacy of the qui tarn system.
An area where we can easily predict the strategies is below the line f  = — in Figure Two.
b
When the parameters take on these values the rewards are too low and the employee never 
files a case. This is true for both equilibrium three and equilibrium five.
C CBetween the lines F  =— and F  = —  there is some indeterminacy and we cannot make clear 
b ba
predictions about the best responses of the employee. In equilibrium one the employee only 
files against firms that acted illegally. This is not the case in equilibrium five where the 
employee never files, irrespective of whether the firm acted legally or illegally. Therefore 
one cannot predict all the best responses of the employee, one can only predict that the 
employee will not file against companies that have acted legally.
In the area between f  -  —  and f  -  ^ +t the employee's best responses are indifferent to
ba b
the choice of the equilibrium. In equilibria one and four the employee will only file against 
those firms that acted illegally. One can therefore predict that the system will work correctly 
and firms will act legally due to the credible threat of being taken to court if they act 
illegally.
Another important factor to note is that the position of the line f  = —  1S dependant on the
ba
value of a. As a  approaches one the gradient of the line F  = —  decreases f _ J l L ] , and
b a  [dC da~ ba2)
it rotates towards the line p = — • Thus as a  increases the size of the indeterminate area, the
b
area between f - £ .  and c  . decreases. Simultaneously, the determinate area between
b ba
F = —  and r  c+t increases. The combined effect is that an increasing a  allows one to be 
ba b
more confident about the prediction of best responses.
Between f -  c+t r and f = c+t there is again some indeterminacy. The best response in 
b ¿{1-a ]
equilibrium four is for the employee not to file against firms that have acted legally while in
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equilibrium two the best response is to file a case whether the firm acted legally or illegally. 
The only thing one can predict here is that the employee will file cases against firms th a t  
have acted illegally.
Above the line j- c+t the employee always files. In this case one can be absolutely 
b[l-a]
certain that if rewards are set too high then the worst outcome will result: employees w ill  
file against legal and illegal firms and thus the optimal strategy of firms is to always a c t  
illegally.
Similar to before, however, the line p -  c+t is dependent on the a  variable. As a  increases
the intercept with the y-axis increases in value, in addition to this the gradient of the lin e
increases f d*F _ l A. The combined movement is therefore an anti-clockwise rotation  
\dCda b[l-o]2 J
around a rising fulcrum. The area above r  c * 1 therefore decreases as a  increases and th e
b{\-a)
area that implies firms always acting illegally decreases.
The above discussion is summarised by the two arrows on Figure Two. Up to the line
f = c + t , represented by Arrow One, the employee will not file against legal firms. Above  
b
the line p  _ represented by Arrow Two, the employee will file against illegal firms. For a  
ba
qui tam system to be successful to the reward structure has to be set so that it is optimal to  
file against illegal companies and a best response not to file against legal companies.
The stark nature of the results is driven by the use of relators. In standard law enforcement i t  
is a government appointed official that decides which individuals should be taken to court 
and the utility function of these prosecutors is usually taken to be the maximisation of social 
welfare. There is therefore little incentive for these authorities to take firms acting legally to  
court. Their limited resources would be better spent on the firms that have acted illegally. 
Furthermore, since these authorities do not normally directly receive the fines there is little 
incentive to prosecute firms that are likely to be acquitted. 11 The result of this, and it holds
11 In the US any fines are given to charity foundations such as the witness protection programme. In the EU the fines 
imposed by the European Court of Justice and DGIV do not go to the specific budget of DGIV, but are added to the 
central EU budget.
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for most transgressions of the law, is that the probability of an innocent party appearing in 
court is very small; much lower than the probability of an guilty person appearing in court. 
Given this the joint probability of an innocent person being found guilty, as defined below, 
is very small.
Prob(convicted & appear in court & acted legally) =
Prob(convicted | appear in court & acted legally) x
Prob( appear in court | acted legally) x Prob(acted legally)
The probability on the left hand side is the probability of a Type One error, the wrongful 
conviction of an innocent person. This is low in the standard models of enforcement as 
Prob(appear in court | acted legally) is very small (in most economic models this probability 
is assumed to be zero).
The problem with the use of relators is that they have to be given a personal stake in the 
claim in order to entice them to come forward and file cases. If the rewards are set too high 
then they will begin to take firms that acted legally to court unless the legal system is almost 
perfect and the judge nearly always acquits firms that acted legally. This personal stake of 
the relator significantly increases Prob(appear in court | acted legally). As a result of this the 
overall probability of Type One errors can increase drastically. This result has also been 
discussed in the literature. Landes & Posner (1975) note that when law is enforced privately 
the enforcers no longer care whether they are prosecuting innocent or guilty defendants. 
Their utility is derived only from fine income so there is a serious risk of over enforcement.
If the court system is not perfect and rewards are very large, provoking many suits, the 
probability of appearing in court given that the firm acted legally will be insignificantly 
different from the probability of appearing in court given that the firm acted illegally. The 
critical factors are therefore Prob(convicted | appear in court and acted legally) and 
Prob(convicted | appear in court and acted illegally). If these two probabilities are similar 
(implying that judges have difficulty distinguishing those who really acted illegally) then 
the two conviction probabilities will be similar. There is therefore little advantage in acting 
legally as the incentive to act legally relies on two factors:
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1. Breaking the law leads to punishment
2. Not breaking the law leads to no punishment.
The problem with the incorrect use of relators is that the probability of being punished even  
though one acted legally can be too high. If it reaches this critical level then firms break the  
law in order to at least gain the benefit of acting illegally.
2.8. Model if With No Fabrication Costs (t - o)
We now move to the case where we eliminate t and see how this affects the model. T he  
elimination of t means that there is no cost difference between preparing and trying a real  
case, where the firm played illegal, and trying a fabricated case when the firm acted legally. 
This situation would be a better representation of reality if the cost of fabricating th e  
evidence of illegalities was a very small (negligible) proportion of the costs of trying the  
case. This is probably not true for cases involving bid-rigging agreements, where th e  
fabrication of evidence of meetings and agreements is likely to be difficult, especially as th e  
employee will have to provide evidence about the other firms in the alleged agreement. 
Where t could be dose to zero, or even zero, is in cases where some fraud has already  
occurred and the employee is trying to make the fraud look even bigger. This may occu r  
when one individual is in charge of preparing and checking all the documentation relating  
to the invoices sent to the government. For this person adjusting the internal and external 
documentation so that extra discrepancies appear, giving the appearance of a larger fraud, 
will be relatively costless. At least in terms of the effort involved.
Like in the model with t > 01 concentrate on the pure strategy equilibria A, B, C and D.12
Proposition 8 (Equilibrium A)
Under the parameter conditions:
12 Some mixed equilibria with reasonable beliefs do exist when t ~ 0. These can be split into two groups. The first set 
consists of those where b F -  C  or abF= C. In this case the employee plays a mixed strategy and the results are a  
combination of the pure strategy equilibria. The other set involves the firm playing a precise mixed strategy and 
the judge playing a pure strategy at one signal and mixed at the other. All the equilibria in this third group can be
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b F > C
the following is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium. 
Beliefs: p G > X
Strategies: = 1,tj- \ , y = 1, < 7  = 1
Proof As equilibrium one.«
Proposition 9 (Equilibrium B)
Under the parameter conditions:
b F < C
the following is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium. 
Beliefs: fiG >
Strategies: ç? = l, 77 = 0, y = 0, p  = l, <7 = 1 
Proof As equilibrium one.*
Proposition 10 (Equilibrium C)
Under the parameter conditions:
abF  > C, bF[\ -a] < C ,a > — ,
F
„n «<P *10* =O r-i . . i iv .f l  n—►«?
[1 -<p" V
^ > i z £ ( ------------> s , < - 2 -
c a  ' [1 -<p"]y" —* l - a
the following is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium.
located above the line b - C / f ,  1 ignore these as equilibrium A seems much more intuitive for these parameter
Beliefs: p c > 1// 2 < 1// 2
Strategies: (p — 0,rj = \,y = 0 ,p  = \,cr = 0
Proof As equilibrium one.»
Proposition 11 (Equilibrium D)
Under the parameter conditions:
abF < C,
_ p V --------------->(yc > i r £ ,
[1 -<p’ Y  ”■*" «  [l-ç>*]y*
the following is a pure strategy sequential equilibrium.
Beliefs: p c >
II-*« ■><5; <
a
1- a
Strategies: <p = 1,17 = 0,y = 0 ,p  = 1,<t  =  0 
Proof As equilibrium one.»
2.9. Discussion
The figure below shows the pure strategy equilibria when the fabrication costs are zero.
conditions.
Figure Four
RESULTS WITH t=0
(ZERO FABRICATION COSTS)
EQ UILIB RIUM A: employ«« files against films w h ich  act illegally a id  ttose w hich  act legally, judge 
condemns onbothsignals; and firm acts illegally.
EQUILIBRIUM B: engdoyee never files; judge w ould  condemn o n  bo th  signals; a id  film  acts illegally. 
EQUILIBRIUM C: employee only files against firms w hich act illegally; judge would condemn on  guilty 
signal and acquit on  a n  innocent signal both signals; a id  firm  acts legally.
EQUILIBRIUM D: employee never files; judge condemns on  guilty signal and acquits o n  innocent signal; and 
firm acts illegally.
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In equilibrium A, which has the same beliefs and strategies as equilibrium two, the firm ’s  
best response is to choose the pure strategy of illegal to obtain the benefit of the crime. T h is  
is the less standard, but equally valid argument for why people commit crime: the judge w ill  
condemn them so they might as well take the benefit of acting illegally if they are going t o  
be fined anyway. This argument is particularly relevant for ex-offenders and probably th e  
real reason behind the innocent until proven guilty maxim. Previous offenders should b e  
treated equally in order to encourage them to re-integrate into society and they should n o t  
feel that they will always be stigmatised by their previous convictions.
In equilibrium B, which has the same beliefs and strategies as equilibrium 3, the firm a c ts  
illegally because it knows that the rewards to the employee are too small to entice him  t o  
file. With no-one filing the optimal strategy is to act illegally. This is the standard argum ent 
for breaking the law. Individuals break the law because the expected value of the fine is to o  
low to deter then from acting this way.
In equilibrium C, which has the same beliefs and strategies as equilibrium four, we obtain  
the only pure strategy equilibrium where the firm does not act illegally.13 This equilibrium  
relies on or, the efficacy of the court system at signalling guilt and innocence, being close to  
one for five reasons.
1. or needs to be large to make it an optimal strategy for the firm not to act illegally. 
With or close to one the firm is likely to be fined if it acts illegally so the best response 
is to act legally.
2. a  needs to be large to make it an optimal strategy for the employee to file when the  
firm acted illegally. With or close to one the signal is likely to be guilty so the 
employee is likely to receive a reward.
3. or needs to be large to make it an  optimal strategy for the employee not to file w hen  
the firm acted legally. With a  close to one the signal is likely to be innocent so the  
employee is not likely to receive a reward.
13 The drawing of equilibrium C in Figure Four, like equilibrium four in Figure Two, also requires the additional 
assumption that a  = TTfF.
4. a needs to be large to make it a reasonable strategy for the judge to condemn the 
firm on a guilty signal. With a close to one the sequence condition for a guilty signal
is easier to fulfil, as — a- becomes smaller as a  increases. 
a
5. a needs to be large to make it a reasonable strategy for the judge to acquit the firm on 
an innocent signal. With a  to one the sequence condition for an innocent signal is
easier to fulfil. As a  increases ——  increases, making it easier to find sequences that
1 - a
converge to a value below _ £ L .
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Equilibrium D has the same best response strategies as equilibrium five in the model with 
t > 0. Again the judge condemns on a guilty signal and acquits on an innocent signal. 
However, the low rewards make not filing an optimal response in both cases. This means 
that the firm's optimal choice is acting illegally.
2.9.1. Employee Best Responses
In common with Figure Two, it is sometimes not clear what the best responses of the 
employee will be under certain parameter conditions.
Below the line f  = — the best responses are easy to predict: the employee never files a case. 
b
This is true for equilibria B and D.
Between the lines f  = — and f  = there is complete indeterminacy. In equilibrium A the
b ba
employee files against all firms where as in D he never files. No predictions are therefore 
possible.
C* rIn the space between F and F  = __ - __  the only prediction possible is that the
ba ¿>[l-a]
employee will file against firms which have acted illegally. This is because in equilibrium A 
the employee always files and in C the employee files only if the firm acted illegally.
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Above the line p  _ c  determinacy is obvious as only one equilibrium is possible. In  
6[l-a]
equilibrium A the employee files against both types.
As before the positions of the lines p _ c  and f ~ ~  depend on a. As a  increases th e
%l-a] ba
area of indeterminacy increases, as p - ~  rotates clockwise towards and p - — ——
ba b b [l-a ]
rotates anti-clockwise. This increasing a  has an unwelcome effect on the predictions b u t a
positive effect from a normative point of view. In the model the increasing a m akes
prediction of the employee's best responses more difficult as it increases the overlap
between equilibrium A and equilibrium C  From a normative point of view the a  increase is
good because it increases the area of A, which is die only equilibrium where employees file
against firms which have acted illegally and not against firms which have acted legally.
2.10. Conclusion
The general conclusion of this paper is that the introduction of a qui tom system is n o  
foolproof panacea for the detection and prosecution of corporate crime. Within this general 
result four specific points should be mentioned.
1. The efficacy of die court system, how good it is at signalling guilt and innocence is 
critical to the success of the system. In the special case where the signal given by the  
court system is perfecdy informative about whether the firm acted legally or illegally 
(illegality is verifiable information) it is possible and optimal to eliminate completely 
corporate crime.
2. When the signal given by the court system is not perfecdy informative no definite 
advice can be given. If the court system almost perfecdy signals the guilt and 
innocence of the firm then the introduction of the system is probably warranted. In 
other words, when the evidence presented in court gives a clear signal about 
whether the firm acted illegally or legally one can be confidant that only the 
employees of illegally acting firms will file cases. If it is difficult, from the evidence 
presented in court, to tell whether the firm acted illegally or legally then one should 
be very w ary about introducing qui iam legislation. The potential rewards may entice
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individuals to invent cases, especially if there is a high probability of judicial error. 
This increased potential for type one errors, relative to systems involving an 
independent prosecution service, means that qui tam systems are only useful when it 
is easy to distinguish between those firms that acted legally and those that acted 
illegally.
3. If there is no difference in the costs of filing a real and a fabricated case then one 
should be very wary about introducing a qui tam system. In the False Claims Act the 
extra expected cost of fabricating a case has two main components: first, the effort 
involved in fabricating rather than collecting the evidence; and second, the increased 
chances of having to pay the legal fees of the acquitted firm under the Act's fee 
shifting arrangements. The larger are the expected costs the more faith one should 
have in a qui tam system. As was stated before, qui tam systems lend themselves more 
to corporate crimes where the evidence is harder to fabricate such as bid-rigging 
cases, since the invention of a bid-rigging offence would involve fabrication of 
evidence about the actions of a number of firms.
4. The model also demonstrates the risk posed by excessively high rewards. Too high 
rewards will encourage employees to file cases against firms that have acted legally. 
If they are successful with these claims then the end result may be firms committing 
more crime, as if firms believe they will be prosecuted whether they act legally or 
illegally it is optimal to act illegally in order to gain the benefit of the crime. 
Especially worrying is the latest news on payoffs. Four years after filing her federal 
False Claims Act suit Mrs Knoob, who worked at Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois, 
has now received the final instalment of her relator payoff of $29,108,999.14 With 
payoffs are large as these there is a serious risk of employees filing against innocent 
firms.
IfflWi..
14 Source: http://www.igc.org/cna/news/ciml2799.html. Blue Cross whistle-blowers reap $29 million. Consulted 
15/10/00.
3. OUTSIDER TRADING AND ANTITRUST ABUSES
3.1. Introduction
Imagine the following example of outsider trading:
Company X is about to publicise the launch of a new product. This new 
product is vastly superior to the products of its competitors and therefore 
likely to significantly reduce their profits. Before the publicising of the 
product Company X takes short positions in the shares of its competitors 
through a combination of puts and short selling. When the product is 
publicised the share prices of the other competitors fall. Company X closes its 
position and pockets the profits.
Presently, it would appear that this type of activity is illegal in the HU but legal in the US. I n  
this paper I discuss the strategic value of these outsider trading opportunities. The resu lts  
show that the role of these outsider trading opportunities is similar to the role of cap acity  
investment in Dixit (1980). First, outsider trading can be used to make threats credible a n d ,  
second, outsider trading moves the reaction function of the trading firm. Dixit (1980) studies  
entry deterrence; here I study predation and cartel stability.
In the predation model I study how the ability of a predator to take a short position in th e  
shares of the target firm can lead to the predator overcoming the standard commitment 
problem. The predator’s gain from the fall in the share price makes the predator’s threats 
credible and rational. Under certain conditions the equilibrium results in the target firm  
exiting the market as soon as it learns of the predation strategy. However, the results a re  
heavily affected by the choice of whether the products are strategic substitutes or strategic 
complements.
The second half of the paper deals with the stability of cartels when cartel members are  
allowed to take short positions in the shares of their competitors. The results show that the  
ability to take short positions in competitors make cartels less stable.
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The only previous paper that studies the strategic effects of short positions is Hansen and 
Lott (1995). They study the effect that short positions have on an entry deterrence game. The 
strategic effects of long positions however, have been more extensively studied.
The effect of taking long positions, in the specific form of cross equity holdings, was studied 
by Reynolds and Snapp (1986). They show that increasing partial equity interests lead to 
smaller output levels and higher prices in Cournot equilibria. Malueg (1992) studies the 
effects of cross equity holdings on the incentives for remaining in a cartel and shows that 
breaking the cartel may lead to reduction in profits because (amongst other reasons) the 
value of the profits obtained from the other firms will decrease if the cartel breaks. Malueg 
(1992) differs from the study of cartels presented here in two main respects. First, in this 
paper I deal with short positions and long positions whereas Malueg (1992) studies only 
long positions. Second, the non-product market profits that result from breaking the cartel 
come from transactions in the financial assets markets, rather than through partial equity 
interests. The profits in the model studied here come from exploiting information 
asymmetries.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 discusses the murky legal environment 
surrounding insider and outsider trading in the EU and the US. Section 3 delivers the model 
of predation and outsider trading, assuming that the products are strategic substitutes. 
Section 4 analyses the effect of outsider trading on the stability of cartels. The conclusions 
are in Section 5. Appendix one contains the results for a predation model where the 
products are strategic complements.
3.2. Legality
In this section I discuss the legality of outsider trading in the EU and the US. In the EU 
outsider trading, like insider trading, seems to be illegal. However, in the US the situation is 
less clear and the definitions of insider trading are almost continually being adjusted by the 
Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court. However, a reading of the current state of the law 
would seem to suggest that outsider trading is legal in the US. For the purposes of this paper 
I define the difference between insider and outsider trading to be the following: outsider 
trading is trading based on information that comes from outside the firm, while insider 
trading is based on information that comes from inside the firm.
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13.2.1. European Union
At the EU level there is no legislation that deals specifically with outsider trading. T h e  
question we must therefore address is whether the legislation on insider trading covers  
outsider trading. Fortunately, there is a European Council Directive that attempts to  
coordinate national legislation on insider trading. Since all the national legislations should  
confirm to this directive it is possible to make generalisations about insider trading law s  
across Europe. The national legislations are influenced by the European Council Directive o f  
13 November 1989 (89/592/EEC ). This directive lays down guidelines for the harmonisation  
of insider trading. The directive defines insider information as the following:
"'inside information1 shall mean information which has not been made public 
of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities, 
which, if it were made public would be likely to have a significant effect on 
the price of the transferable securities in question;" (Art. 1.1).
Note that this definition has two parts. The first part deals with 'information which has n o t  
been made public of a precise nature'. It does not make any statements about where th is  
information comes from. This is very important for the discussion of insider and outsider 
trading. Insider information comes from within the firm; outsider information from outside  
the firm. The text here makes no distinction as to the source of the information. Therefore, it  
would seem that outside information is a subset of the 'inside information1 defined above, 
and whether it originated in the competitor firm or in the trading firm is irrelevant.
The second part deals with whether the information 'if it were made public would be likely 
to have a significant effect on the price*. The information that one firm is about to attempt to  
force another to exit through the use of a predation strategy, or that it is about to break from  
a cartel, is undoubtedly a piece of information which would have 'a significant effect on the  
price of the transferable securities in question*.
It would appear that outsider trading is covered by Article 1. The next step is analyse 
whether making use of this for personal gain is illegal. This is covered by Article 2, which 
states:
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"Each Member State shall prohibit any person1 who:
- by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies of the issuer,
- by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or
- because he has access to such information by virtue of the exercise of his 
employment profession, or duties, possesses inside information from taking 
advantage of that information with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring 
or disposing of for his own personal account, or for the account of a third 
party, either directly or indirectly, transferable securities of the issuer or 
issuers to which that information relates."
Due to the specifics of the legal question here we have to analyse the decision at the 
individual level, rather than the firm level. It is clear that the person in the trading firm 
acquired the information through 'the exercise of his employment, profession, or duties' and 
is taking advantage of the information by trading on behalf of the third party, which is in 
this case the trading firm. One can therefore be fairly confident in concluding that outsider 
trading should be illegal in all the EU states that have enacted this Directive into their 
national legislation.
The Directive was adopted into English and Welsh law in the Criminal Justice Act of 1993. 
The offence is laid out in Section 52:
"(1) An individual who has information as an insider is guilty of insider 
dealing if, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3), he deals in 
securities that are price affected securities in relation to the information... *
Article 2.2 covers the case of where the person is a firm and states:
"Where the person referred to in paragraph 1 is a company or other type of legal person, the 
prohibition laid down in that paragraph shall apply to the natural persons who take part in the 
decision to carry out the transaction for the account of the legal person concerned."
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1(3) The circumstances referred to above are that the acquisition or disposal in 
question occurs on a regulated market, or that the person dealing relies on a 
professional intermediary or is himself acting as a professional intermediary/'
The rest of the Act then continues with the definitions of the above words. The most lo g ic a l  
conclusion is that outsider trading is illegal in England and Wales.
3.2.2. United States
In contrast to the situation in the European Union, in the US outsider trading would seem  t o  
be legal under certain conditions. Insider trading has never been precisely defined by th e U S  
Congress. Instead, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was left to control in s id e r  
trading by using two broad antifraud provisions in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1 9 3 4 :  
§ 10(b)2 and Rule lOb-53. The SEC gradually widened the scope of these provisions, and b y  
the 1970s the general view was that anyone holding material, non-public information w a s  
subject to a 'disclose or abstain rule'. The Supreme Court then sharply curtailed liability in  
Chiarella v. United States, 445 US. 222 (1980) and Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
103 S. Ct 3255 (1983). Here the Court stated that there was no general duty to abstain f r o m  
trading when in possession of material, non-public information and developed the fiduciary  
duty theory of liability. A  sister theory, the misappropriation theory, was validated in United
2 The relevant parts of §10 state: i
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange-.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national 
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
3 Rule 10b-5 states:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange,
a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
b. To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or
c. To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
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States v. 0 'Hagan, 117 S. Ct 2199 (1997). These two theories, and their effect on outsider 
trading are discussed below.
The fiduciary duty doctrine is based on a trust relationship between individuals. For 
example, the employees of a firm are deemed to have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of 
that firm. Any insider in that firm who trades on non-public information is deemed to have 
violated that duty. The subsequent case law expanded the definition of insider and 
developed a derivative fiduciary duty to catch those tippees4 who received information from 
insiders. With reference to the specific issue studied here it would seem that a firm that 
engages in outsider trading would escape liability under the fiduciary duty doctrine. This is 
because the employees of the trading firm owe no duty to the shareholders of the competitor 
firm and without a duty there cannot be a breach of duty.
The misappropriation theory holds a defendant liable if he trades with material non-public 
information and the defendant breaks a fiduciary duty to the source of that information. In 
other words, the defendant is held guilty if he misappropriates the information and uses it 
for trading. In this paper I study the case of a firm that generates its own non-public 
information and then takes positions in the financial instruments of other companies in 
order to benefit from this information. There is therefore no misappropriation since the 
defendant, the dealing firm, is not violating a fiduciary duty to the source of the information 
because the source of the information , is the same dealing firm. Consequently, it appears 
unlikely that the trading firm could be found guilty of insider trading under the 
misappropriation doctrine.
In sum, it seems that the trading firm can escape sanctions under Section 10. This loophole 
was pointed out in Olsen et al (1985), which states:
"... absent application of rule 14e-3, which is limited to tender offers, and
application of the misappropriation theory, insiders of one corporation
4 Elack's Law Dictionary defines tippees as:
"In securities law, person who acquires material non-public information from another who enjoys a 
fiduciary relationship with the company to which such information pertains. Persons given 
information by insiders in breach of trust."
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apparently may use material, non-public information to trade in the securities 
of another corporation."(p.247).
In conclusion, therefore, it would appear that the outsider trading actions described in  th e  
models below would seem to be illegal in the EU but legal in the US.
3*3. Predatory Pricing When Products Are Strategic Substitutes
In tiiis section I describe the predation model based on goods that are strategic substitutes.5. 
In the model there are two publicly quoted firms. Label them Firm A (the predator) a n d  
Firm B (the prey). They both sell a perfectly homogenous commodity.
Demand is given by the following linear inverse demand function
= 0  if qA+ q ,>  1
Where the subscripts indicate the firm. I simplify by assuming that the firms have z e ro  
marginal production costs. The two firms must pay a sunk cost in each period they produce. 
Let this sunk cost equal FA<fy  for Firm A and f 8 < for Firm B6
The time line of the game is as follows:
1. Firm A sells short the shares of Firm B.
2. Firm B learns about this.
3. Firm B chooses to: a) pay the sunk cost F B and produce; or b) exit the market.
4. Production, collection of revenues and declaration of liquidating dividend.
5. Firm A closes its short position in Firm B.
5 The term strategic substitutes originates from Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).
6 F . and F b are set to below in order to ensure that both firms have make a strictly positive profit.
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Given this structure the game is a two stage game and the relevant solution concept is 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Before I solve the game though I give a more precise 
description of the time line.
3.3.1. Description of Time Line
1. Firm A is takes a negative position in the shares of Firm B, with Firm B unaware of 
this. By the phrase 'taking a negative position11 mean that Firm A invests in financial 
instruments that will allow it to profit from the fall in the share price of Firm B. This 
may involve selling Firm B short, in which case the shares would be sold now and 
bought back later, or it may involve the purchase of put options that are based on the 
underlying shares. In order to calculate the value of these financial transactions we
must assign a value to the share price of Firm B. The usual way to obtain the share 
price is to calculate the present value of the future dividends. It is known that in the 
absence of strategic behaviour, which financial markets do not expect to occur, the 
market will be a Cournot duopoly that lasts one period. The profits the stock market 
expects from Firm B are therefore Since we are dealing with only one
production period this figure of fy -F A is also taken to be the initial share price of
Firm B. The market is assumed to be unaware of the predation strategy and the
private knowledge of the predation strategy allows Firm A to make supra-normal 
profits in the financial assets market.
Rather than develop a detailed model of the financial market I follow Hansen and 
Lott (1995) and introduce the parameter 0 < p  < 1. The parameter (3 represents the 
change in the value of Firm B that Firm A is able to appropriate. So if the fall in the 
value of Firm B was x  then by going short and taking options positions the total 
change in value that could be appropriated by Firm A would be fix. I therefore model 
all the financial profits that are made as ¡3 times the change in the share price.7
P can also be interpreted as incorporating the reaction of the financial market makers. A smaller p would mean that 
the market makers were more responsive to the demand and supply conditions in the market In the case studied 
here Firm A wishes to take a very large short position in the shares of Firm B. This desire to sell the shares of Firm 
A, a large supply, may lead to the price falling, depending on the responsiveness of the market makers. A fall in 
the selling share price, or, alternatively, a rise in the buying price, would reduce the supranonnal profits that Firm 
B could make. See Leland (1992) for an insider dealing model along these lines.
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In order to concretize the description below I talk about selling the share short, if t h i s  
were to be the only financial strategy adopted by Firm A then one could think of p  a s  
the proportion of Firm B's shares that Firm A is able to sell short. By going short F i r m  
A enters into an agreement to sell the shares now and buy them back later, at a l o w e r  
price, after it has enacted the predation strategy.
2. After it is has taken the short position Firm A then communicates this information t o  
Firm B. The implicit assumption is therefore that the trading strategy is observable.
3. Firm B now makes the decision of whether to pay Fb and produce, or exit the m a rk et.
4. If Firm B decides to stay in the market then the firms compete & la C o u rn ot. 
Otherwise Firm A acts a monopolist. After production the revenues are collected a n d  
the profit levels are announced to the market. The firms then promise to pay th e s e  
profits out as a liquidating dividend. The public announcement of the profit le v e ls  
leads a change in the share prices of the firms.
5. Firm A closes its trading position after Firm B's share price has changed.
This is an opportune moment to describe the information assumptions. Firm A has com plete  
and perfect information. Firm B has complete and perfect information about the m ark et  
parameters and the amounts produced. With regard to the trading strategy, Firm B is  
unaware of the trading strategy until Firm A announces it. The market knows only th e  
current profit level. Having fully described the game I now go on to solve the game through  
backwards induction. I therefore solve the Stage Two production game first.
Proposition 12: If both firms produce output in Stage Two then the profits are die following:
n , =
n , =
l
(3 + /02
1
(3 + /? )2
- F .
- F .
Proof: The maximisation function of Firm A is made up of two parts: the product market 
profits and the trading profits. This is shown below:
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n , , = ( i - ? , , - g ,  )? , ,+ /?
, 9
Where
(l -  qA -  qB )qA are the standard product market profits, and
_ (i _ qA_ gB j  is the change in the share price of Firm B, multiplied by /?.
This gives a reaction function for Firm A of8
The reaction function of Firm B is the usual Cournot Reaction function
Substituting and manipulating the reaction functions gives the following results.
.  _ * + / ?  1 D_  1 
r> ,(1b ~ -  r> ’ ^3 + f i ”  3 + 0 ’ 3 + 0
The profits for Firm B are
(3+f l f
- F .
and therefore the profits of Firm A
n  _/t 1 l + + . a A  * \ p
A (1 3 + / ?  3 + /? 3 + /? ^  9 (3+>5)2) A
S The second order condition is fulfilled since d2U4 _ 
d'qA
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Which simplifies to
n , = (3+/?)'
Proposition 13: If Firm B does not produce in Stage Two then the profits are the following:
nA=Up{\-FA), n a =o
4 9
Proof: Follows from the initial value of Firm B and the monopoly profits of V*m
Having worked out the equilibrium profits we can now move to Firm B’s decision o f  
whether to produce or exit the market.
Corollary 14: In Stage One Firm B will decide to produce output if i F n and Firm  B
will exit the market if 1 F s 0 .
( 3 + / 0 2 '
Proof: In Stage One Firm B has the choice between two options. It can pay F B and produce
or exit the market. Its Coumot-Nash equilibrium profits will be i r  . Only if this v a lu e
(3 + ft)2 ‘
is bigger than zero will it decide to produce since its alternative is to exit the market a n d  
obtain profits of zero.*
In sum, there are two subgame perfect equilibria. When 1 F  <0 Firm B exits the
(3 + P ?
market and Firm A obtains the monopoly profits. In the other, when 1 r  >0 Firm B
(3 + /?)2 '
remains in the market and the profits are n  = - + £ - - f  and n 1 r- ,
" 4 9 " (3+fiY B
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3.3.2. Analysis and Comparative Statics
The results above show that the use of the outsider trading strategy means that Firm A can 
credibly commit to increasing its output. The diagram below shows the standard Cournot
reaction functions of the form a = and a _ l—9 a . It also shows the position of the new
Ha 2 2
reaction function of Firm A, marked as RA{qB)for a /? value of 0.2. In the standard strategic 
substitutes models, like Dixit (1990), the firm takes an action that shifts its reaction function 
outwards. Here there is a clockwise rotation of the reaction function rather than a shift. The 
effect is the same though, Firm A increases its output and Firm B reduces its output. This is 
because the products are strategic substitutes. Firm B's best response to an increase in output 
by Firm A is to decrease output; Firm B's best response is to act less aggressively when Firm 
A acts aggressively. The result of this is an increase in the product market profits of Firm A 
and a decrease in the profits of Firm B. Although the price falls Firm A produces more and 
so its total revenue increases. Firm B produces less and sells its production at a lower price,
so its profit level falls. Without outsider trading the revenues of Firm B were I ,  its new
revenues are 1 . Whether this new lower profit level of 1 is higher or lower than
(3 + ^ ) 2 (3+/?)2
Firm B’s sunk costs will determine whether Firm B stays in the market or exits the market. If
1 F then Firm B will remain in the market. If 1 < F then Firm B will decide to
(3 + /?)2 a (3 + /?): 5
exit the market. It is therefore clear that higher levels of Fb make Firm B more likely to exit 
the market.
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Figure Five: Effect of Outsider Trading on Reaction Functions
In the language of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) Firm A plays a Top Dog strategy. T h e  
enaction of the predation strategy makes Firm A tougher because the predation strategy  
reduces the profits of Firm B. This, when combined with the fact that the products a re  
strategic substitutes, leads to the optimality of the Top Dog strategy.
Returning to the increase in the profit levels of Firm A, the benefit of the outsider trading
strategy to the predatory firm is clear. The strategy gives Firm A an added reason for
increasing its output. Normally in predation models the predating firm has to forego som e
short-run profits in order to obtain the larger monopoly profits in the long run. Here the
product market profits of Firm A actually increase when it is carrying out the predation
strategy (it is easily shown that 1+ff F > I _  F  . So the product market profits obtained
(3+/?)2 4 9 A
when engaging in the predation strategy are higher than the profits obtained in the standard 
Cournot Nash Equilibrium. Furthermore, this increase makes the predation strategy m ore  
credible because the increased output is a best response in the subgame. The increased 
profitability of predation also goes someway to countering McGee's (1958) observation that 
predation is unlikely because merger is a more profitable strategy. Here the use of outsider 
trading increases the profitability of predation, thus making it more likely.
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3.32.1 Comparative Statics zv.r.t. ¡3
The diagram below shows the effect of an increase in ¡3
Figure Six -  ¡3 Comparative Statics
An increase in ¡3 leads to the Nash equilibrium output consisting of a higher level of output 
for Firm A and a lower level of output for Firm B. The net effect is an increase in output and 
therefore the price is lower. (3 has differing effects on the profits of the firms. An increase in (3 
increases the profits of Firm A since it toughens it stance and allows it to profit from the 
change in the value of Firm B. In contrast an increase in f3 decreases the profits of Firm B 
since it leads to Firm B producing less. This decrease in output reduces the revenue of Firm 
B and thus its profits.
3.3.3 Summary
The use of outsider trading solves the commitment problem for the predatory firm. Taking a 
short position in the other firm increases the aggressiveness of the predatory firm and makes 
the threat of predation credible. This is due to the fact that the goods are strategic 
substitutes. Acting aggressively increases the predator's profits and reduces the target's 
profits. The use of outsider trading also leads to an increase in current profits. This contrasts 
with the standard predation literature where the decrease in current profits is justified by 
the desire for increases future, post predation, profits. However, the appendix shows that 
this result only holds for strategic substitutes. If the products are strategic complements then 
the standard predation result applies: the firm has to be sure of large trading profits, or that 
the target will exit, before it engages in predation.
V Cartel Stability and Outsider Trading
w~J" o'
0 3 d 0 ^
In this section I discuss the effect of outsider trading on the stability of cartels. Below I show  
that the addition of outsider trading opportunities makes cartels less stable. This is because  
these opportunities increase the payoff from deviating from the cartel.
The model is set up with the following assumptions. There are n firms in the industry, 
interacting in a infinitely repeated number of production periods. In each production period
n
the demand function is linear and the price is given by p  = 1 -Q , where Q = ^ q r  The co st
1-1
n
of production is set to zero. Each firm's profit is and n  = • I assume that the firm s
i~l
compete a la Cournot and therefore in each period the firm's strategy space is the decision of  
what quantity to produce. When they are in the cartel this is the decision of whether to  
produce the cartel output or to deviate and cheat on the cartel. I assume that if the cartel 
breaks down the firms produce the Cournot output forever.
When we move to the model including the opportunity to use outsider trading strategies the  
structure of the model becomes more complicated. The assumptions about the market m ade  
above hold but it is now necessary to make additional assumptions about the outsider 
trading strategy. Like the previous model I concentrate on the decision of one firm, Firm A, 
and its decision of whether or not to break the cartel. The decision of Firm A boils down to  
the following two options:
1. Take a negative position in the other cartel members and then break the cartel; or
2. Stay in the cartel.
Remaining in the cartel simply implies that all the firms, including Firm A, produce the 
cartel output in every one of the periods. The decision to break the cartel is more 
complicated and is described below.
If Firm A takes this path then it first takes a negative position in die financial instruments of 
the other firms. By the phrase 'taking a negative position1 I mean that Firm A invests in 
financial instruments that will allow it to profit from the fall in the share prices of the other
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cartel members. This may involve selling the other cartel members short, in which case the 
shares would be sold now and bought back later, or it may involve the purchase of put 
options that are based on the underlying shares. In order to calculate the value of these 
financial transactions it is necessary to assign a value to the share prices of the other cartel 
members. The usual way to calculate the share price is to calculate the present value of the 
future dividends. In this model I assume that the cartel members have already produced in 
the market in the past and previously produced the cartel output. This means that each firm
produces an output of JL  and the per period profits for each firm are J _ .  The profits the
2n An
stock market expects from each cartel member are therefore J _  Since the game is repeated
An
over an infinite number of period the share price of the cartel members will be the present
value of an infinite stream of — . If the discount factor is 5 ,0  < 5  < 1, then the share price of
An
each cartel member will be 1 . The implicit assumption is therefore that the market
4 n (l-£ )
knows only the current profit levels. The private knowledge of the cartel and its decision to 
break it allows Firm A to make supra-normal profits in the financial assets market.
Rather than develop a detailed model of the financial market I follow Hansen and Lott 
(1995) and introduce the parameter 0 < p i  1. The parameter ¡3 represents the change in the 
value of each cartel member that Firm A is able to appropriate. So if the fall in the value of a 
cartel member was x then by going short and taking options positions the total change in 
value that could be appropriated by Firm A would be fix. I therefore model all the financial 
profits that are made as p times the change in the share price.5 *9
In order to concretize the description below I talk about selling the share short, if this were 
to be the only financial strategy adopted by Firm A then one could think of p as the 
proportion of Firm B's shares that Firm A is able to sell short. By going short Firm A enters
5 can also be interpreted as incorporating the reaction of the financial market makers. A smaller /? would mean that 
the market makers were more responsive to the demand and supply conditions in the market. In the case studied 
here Firm A wishes to take a very large short position in the shares of Firm B. This desire to sell the shares of Finn
A, a large supply, may lead to the price falling, depending on the responsiveness of the market makers. A fall in
the selling share price, or a rise in the buying price, would reduce the supranormal profits that Firm B could make.
See Leland (1992) for an insider dealing model along these lines.
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into an agreement to sell the shares now. Firm A will then buy them back later, at a lo w e r  
price, after it has broken the cartel.
If Firm A deviates from the cartel then it will increase its output. Firm A's increase in o u tp u t  
will have two effects. First, it will lead to a change in the product market profits of Firm  A  
due to the increase in output. Second, this increase will also affect the profits of the o th e r  
cartel members. Their profit levels will fall in the deviation stage and therefore their sh a re  
price will fall as well. As was stated above, the market assumes that the profit obtained in  
the current period will continue forever. After it has produced the deviation output Firm  A  
closes its position in the shares of the other firms. It does this by buying back the shares a t  
their new lower price.
At this point it makes sense to clearly define the information assumptions. Firm A h a s  
complete and perfect information. The other cartel members are completely unaware of th e  
trading strategy but have complete and perfect information about the market param eters 
and the amounts produced. The stock market knows only the current profit level, and p rices  
the shares accordingly.
After the deviation stage the firms return to producing the Cournot output in every one o f  
the remaining periods.
Returning to the deviation stage, when Firm decides to break, it is necessary to change the  
maximisation function of Firm A to include the opportunities available from outsider 
trading. The maximisation function of Firm A in the deviation stage is:
n „  = / IX 1 Ì 1 /I r t-1  1- ( « - ! ) —  \qA + £ - — ( - ----- (1 - q A i  ) t ~
V 2n 1 - S  4 n 2 n 2 n
W here :
^\-qA is the price in the product market
qA is the quantity produced by Firm A
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p  is the proportion of the change in value of the other individual firms that is 
appropriable by Firm A
(n - 1) is the number of firms, other than the trading firm, in the market
1
1 - S
gives the share price of the other firms as a function of the current profit levels
( J —  (i -  q - Ü -J)_L  is the change in the profits of the other firms in the cartel; —  is 
An In 2 n An
the original level of per period profits and i \ - q A will be the total profits of
2 n 2 n
the other firms in the deviation stage.
Maximising this with respect to qA gives
n+1 „ n —1------ + B -------------
An An(l~S)
However, this output can never lead to a price below zero, so the limit on qA is
This translates into the following values for qA in the deviation stage
n + l
2 n
if  P>
fl+1 „ n — 1 . .  n
------+ p ------------  if  p<
An 4n(l — 5)
(l -S)(n + l) 
n - 1
Q-^Xii + l)
n - 1
When /? is large Firm A is able to appropriate a large proportion of the change in value of the
firms. If 8 is above the cut off value of 0  -<?)Qi + l) then the gains from forcing the other firms'
«-1
share prices down are large enough to make it optimal to drive the price in the deviation 
stage to zero. In this case there is a com er solution and although Firm A does not gain any 
excess profits from cheating on the cartel in the deviation stage it obtains large profits from 
outsider trading.
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When p is smaller the optimal deviation output results in a strictly positive price in the  
deviation stage. With a smaller p the gains from outsider trading are smaller and it is 
therefore the best response is an internal solution that results in a positive price.
In the following I therefore split the discussion into two parts. First I discuss the case w h en  p
is large the deviation output level is equal to . and the price in the
w-1 2 n
deviation stage falls to zero. I then discuss the case when p is not so large <iIz£K iLti2) ,
n-\
the deviation output is ” +1 1 q n~l - and the price in the deviation stage is strictly
4n P 4n(l-S)
positive.
3.4.1. P  = 0 In The Deviation Period (y? > ——
n~\
Proposition 15: With (ƒ? > iL_£Kl±ll) the cartel stability condition for S  is:
M-l
4 n
Proof: Given (p>  the Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC) of the deviating
» -1
firm will be a comparison of the following: On the one hand there are the cartel profits
which are 1 On the other hand there are the deviation profits, which are zero since  
4n( \ -S)
P = Oin the deviation stage, plus the trading profits of plus the future stream of
r  \-5 4n
Cournot profits of 5 The trading profits are s 1 v  since the share price of the 
( l - 5 ) ( « + i ) 2 H \ - S  4n
other firms will fall to zero as the profits fall to zero.
The condition for remaining in the cartel, the ICC, is therefore:
1
An{\~d)
> ^ i L z l (± )+
H \ - 8 KAn
Ô
Which translates into the following condition on the discount factor:
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An
3.4.I.J. Analysis and Comparative Statics
The sign of the inequality above contrasts with the usual cartel stability condition. In 
standard cartel stability models the firm will break the cartel if the discount factor is low. 
This is because the benefits from staying in the cartel are the continuing monopoly profits in 
the future. This is compared to the sum of short term one period deviation profits that one 
obtains by cheating on the cartel plus the following Cournot profits. Therefore/ the higher 
the discount factor the more one cares about those future cartel profits and the less likely 
one is to break the cartel. This is not the case when 3  ^(l-£)(n + l) Here the cartel is only
n -1
stable if the discount factor is low. Why this is true is explained below.
In the trading model above the discount factor also enters into the share price of the non 
trading firms. Simple maths shows that the current level of the share price increases as the 
discount factor increases. Therefore the trading profits increase as the discount factor
increases, 3  n ~1 r * 0  -  ~ 1) . q)  an increase in the discount factor leads to increased
^ d S ^ l - s W )  4(S~l)2n ,
trading profits. These large trading profits increase the incentives for breaking the cartel.
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The effect of Ô on the share price works in the opposite direction to the standard discount 
factor effect. With a large /? the effect on the share price dominates. Therefore under th ese  
parameter conditions 5  has to be small for the cartel to survive. The exact effect is sh ow n  
on the diagram below for different levels of p .
Figure Seven: /? Comparative Statics
On the diagram above the top line represents /? = 0 .1, the middle p  =  0.2 and the bottom  
p  = 0 .3 . The discount factor must be below the line so one can see that as P  increases it 
becomes more and more difficult for the cartel to survive.
m3.4.2. P  > 0 In the Deviation Period ^  <i!l£^iL±!i)
n-1
Proposition 16: p < Q-<*)(w+i) the quadratic cartel stability condition on £is
n-l
0 > S 1 (n2 + 6n + 1 ) -  2S(n2 + 4n + 1 + p{n  + 1) 2)+ ¡3(n + 1)! (fi + 2 )+  (n + 1);
Proof: Given q c (l-<?)(" + !) the Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC) of the deviating
n - l
firm will be a comparison of the following: On the one hand there are the cartel profits
which are 1 . On the other hand there are the deviation profits and trading profits,
4n(l- £ )
which are described below, and the future stream of Cournot profits of
( l-* )(«  + l)3
The profits in the deviation stage are equal to the sum of the product market profits and the 
trading profits. These are shown below
n A = ( i - ( — + / ? — i : l—  ) - ( / i - i ) j - ) ( ^ + > g  / ” 1)„ .)
An An(\-8 ) ‘ 2 n An 4 « ( l - £ ) '
+ / ? — (—  ~ ( i ~ (— + p  1-  )
H \ -S  4n 4n y  4 n Q -S )' 2n ’ in
This simplifies to:
A An 4 / i ( l -d )  An 4«(l-<5)
/ ? ( « - ! )  » - !  / ? ( » - ! )  v
1 -8  K8n2)  8n2(l~Sy
These deviation profits are slid into the following cartel incentive compatibility constraint:
1 ^ w + 1 / ? ( n - l ) ^ yi + l t P { n - 1) }
4w(l-<5) An A n(l-8 ) An 4 « (1 -^ )  
/ ? ( n - l ) , n - L  / ? ( « - ! )  . 8
i i r r ) - ) + '1 - 8  8 n2 8/i2 (1 — <5) 0 - 5 ) ( n  + l)
The condition above simplifies to the following quadratic condition on 8
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O > 8 1 (n2 + 6n + 1) -  2S(n2 + 4n+1+ß(n  +1)1 )+ ß (n + 1): ( ß +2)+ (n+ 1)2 ■
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3.4.U. Analysis and Comparative Statics
Here p  is relatively small and so the price in the deviation stage is strictly positive. The 
Incentive Compatibility constraint obtained for the case when outsider trading is possible,
and p < is the following:
rt-1
0 > S 2 (n 2 + 6/1 + l ) -  26(n2 + An+1 + P(n + 1)2)+ p {n + 1) 2 (P + 2) + (n + 1)J
If we set the right hand side equal to zero then we can obtain the two quadratic roots of the 
above equation. These roots take the values1:
(2  + 2/fa* + 4fln + 2fi+ 8n  + 2n2)
2(n + 6 n + l )
±4^j(nz -  p 2n -  2 /?2« 2 - 2pnl -  f i n - P 'n '-  pn ')
These two roots are plotted on the diagram below for some values of p. The line to the far 
left line is for = 0.15,  then P  = 0 .1, then p  -  0 .05, and then p  = 0 (the case of no outsider 
trading).
Figure Eight: p  Comparative Statics
1 Note that if = 0 these simplify to Sx — 1 and Öx =
n2 + 6« + l
the standard results.
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The area to the left of the two lines is the area where the cartel is stable and deviation is n o t  
optimal. The reason for the upper and lower bound on the stability of cartels is the dual role  
of <5 in the model: S  affects the share price of the other firms (as described above) and the  
value of the future cartel profits lost by breaking the cartel. The interaction of these effects 
results in the two boundaries. If S  is too high the resulting high share price changes m ean  
that the trading profits from breaking the cartel are large, and so it is optimal to produce the  
deviation output and break the cartel. If 8  is very low then the dominant effect is the low  
value the deviating firm puts on the future cartel profits. It is therefore optimal to break the  
cartel since the instant increase in profits is more than enough to compensate for the loss of 
future cartel profits.
One can also see that the addition of outsider trading reduces the parameter window that 
leads to successful collusion. With no outsider trading the cartel is stable in the area above 
the line for p=0. When one includes outsider trading opportunities the window which  
supports collusion becomes much smaller, and gets smaller as /? increases. This leads us to a  
discussion of the comparative statics.
The comparative statics are complicated by the fact that there are two solutions for each
value of n. It is therefore impossible to sign the derivatives as they are different depending
on which section of the line we are dealing with. The derivative with respect to ft is positive
td<s > o) / so the incentive compatibility constraint is harder to fulfil. An increase in the level
dp
of p always makes the firm more likely to break the cartel as it increases the trading profits 
that are obtained from deviating from the cartel. This effect is always bigger than the 
countervailing effect. This countervailing effect is the fact that a higher ƒ? reduces the 
deviation profits. This is because a higher /? Firm A to be more aggressive and hurt its 
opponents more, this larger increase output unfortunately hurts Firm A as well as it suffers 
from the high output it dumps on tire market in the deviation game.
3.4.3. Cartel Stability and Long Positions
In this section I discuss the problems associated with taking a long position in one’s fellow 
cartel members. Malueg (1992) deals with the effects of partial equity holdings in one’s 
fellow cartel members. These partial equity holdings allow the cartel members to distribute 
their profits around the participating firms. If Firm A has an equity stake of 20% of Firm B,
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and vice versa, then 20% of the profits that Firm A makes go to Firm B, and vice versa. 
Malueg (1992) therefore deals with only one part of the benefits of holding a stake in the 
equity of a firm in the same industry: one obtains a share of their profits. The other benefit is 
that one can benefit from changes in the share prices of firms in the same industry. It is the 
second benefit I concentrate on, to the extent that I ignore the first.
It may appear that taking long positions in the shares of the other cartel members may lead 
to a cartel becoming more stable. In the following I show why when short positions are also 
allowed this is not true.
The standard cartel incentive compatibility constraint is given below:
riw s n c
1- S  D 1 - s
Where I1A/ are the per period cartel profits, n o the deviation profits, n c the Cournot per
period profits, and S  is the discount factor. As is well known, the firms will only stay in the 
cartel if the discount rate is sufficiently high.
The cartel can be made more stable (supportable with a lower discount factor) if an extra 
cost is added to the right hand side of this equation. This is where the use of long positions 
becomes useful. If the cartel members hold long positions in each other then they will 
experience a loss if the share prices of the other members falls. Let the absolute value of this 
loss be denoted by L . The new incentive compatibility constraint is
n „
1 - s > n D
m c 
+ i - s - L
The addition of a negative value to the RHS makes the condition easier to fulfil. Therefore it
should be possible to support cartels with a discount rate which is lower than that required
by a standard cartel. The standard cartel discount factor incentive constraint is n 0- n c .
-  IV
With the addition of L this condition becom esj: n p- n f - £ . The derivative of this condition
n „ - n c- l
with respect to L is negative. So as the loss increases the cartel becomes more stable. 
Situations may therefore arise when the firms cannot credibly commit to remain in a cartel,
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due to low discount factors, but were they to all agree to take long positions in each other 
then they could then credibly commit to not cheating on the cartel. In this way the use of
long positions could be used to support unstable cartels.
However, there is a problem with this argument. In the section on the use of short positions 
the assumption was made that it was possible to build up a short position without the other 
cartel members knowing this. Therefore, to be consistent, one should make the sam e  
assumption here. If this is the case then it would be possible to build up a short position 
which cancels out the long position which is already held. The net result would be that the  
firm with the long and short position would be in the same situation as a firm without a  
trading position. It would therefore face the standard incentive cartel incentive constraint 
and would break the cartel. This is because the reason the long position were taken in the  
first place was to shore up a previously unstable cartel. Knowing that this could occur no  
firm could credibly commit to maintaining a long position. With credible commitment n ot 
possible no firm would take a long position and the cartel would break down.
3.5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to study the effects of outsider trading opportunities on the 
incentives to predate and the stability of cartels. The results for the predation models are  
heavily affected by whether one assumes the products are strategic substitutes or strategic 
complements.
With strategic substitutes outsider trading is very effective and makes successful predation 
much more likely. The fact that the predator can, by taking a short position, gain extra 
trading profits when predation leads to a drop in the profits and share price of the target 
firm makes predation more profitable and makes the threat of predation more credible. The 
results show that with outsider trading the predating firm actually increases its profits when 
it is predating, and does not have to rely on the promise of future profits to justify predation. 
This credibility effect of outsider trading is very similar to the effect of investment in 
capacity in Dixit (1980), as it leads to a shift in the reaction function of the predating firm. In 
other words taking a short position is a Top Dog strategy, according to the taxonomy of 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
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When the products are strategic complements outsider trading is a much less effective tool 
when predating. Although outsider trading leads to a reduction in the profits of the target 
firm, this reduction is much smaller than when the products are strategic substitutes. This is 
because when the products are strategic complements the best response of the target firm to 
an aggressive move by the predator is a similarly aggressive move. The predator, knowing 
that any predatory price cut will lead to the target firm also cutting its price, is loath to 
reduce its price because this will result in a very damaging price war. The predator's 
incentives to reduce prices are much weaker, because it will suffer large losses, and the 
results show that predation will only be carried out when it leads to the immediate exit of 
the target firm.
The study of cartels and outsider trading shows that outsider trading always makes cartels 
less stable. Short positions increase the incentives to break the cartel, as the deviating firm 
can profit from the fall in profits and thus share prices of its fellow cartel members. 
Furthermore, short positions can also be used to negate any long positions that were used to 
shore up a weak cartel. A long position in the shares of fellow cartel members means that 
any firm deviating from the cartel will incur an extra loss due to the fall in value of these 
holdings. This increases the costs of deviating, and thus could lead to cartels being more 
stable. However, since one can easily build up a short position to negate this long position, 
long positions cannot be used to commit credibly to joining a cartel. Therefore outsider 
trading always makes cartels less stable.
The normative implications of the above results on outsider trading are unclear. For insider 
trading there is a wealth of studies showing that it welfare effects are ambiguous. On the one 
hand insider trading may lead to faster and better information incorporation, on the other 
hand outsiders may demand a premium for the risk of losing out to insiders.2 For outsider 
trading the only previous paper is Hansen and Lott (1995). They study the effects of outsider 
trading on the probability of entry and find that the welfare effects of allowing outsider 
trading are ambiguous, primarily because the welfare effects of entry are also unclear.3 Here 
I show that outsider trading leads to predation being more successful, undoubtedly a
2 See Leland (1992) and Kyle (1985), or Jain and Mirman (1999) and Repullo (1999) for more recent contributions.
J Mankiw and Whinston (1986) describe the business stealing' effect. When one firm enters it lowers the profits of 
the others, and since this negative externality is ignored by the entrant there may be excessive entry
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negative aspect, but also makes cartels less stable, undoubtedly a positive effect. No clear 
implications can be drawn, and it is perhaps appropriate that this ambiguity is mirrored in 
the legislative environment, where outsider trading appears to be legal in the United States, 
but illegal in the European Union.
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APPENDIX A. PREDATORY PRICING MODEL WHEN
PRODUCTS ARE STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTS
In this appendix I once again calculate the results for the predation model. The difference 
this time is that I choose a model where the goods are strategic complements rather than 
strategic substitutes. Therefore a complication arises. When the goods are strategic 
complements it is not always certain that the predator firm will obtain higher profits in the 
predation period. Indeed, I show below that two sufficient conditions for predation to be 
rational are that /? is large (the trading firm can capture a large share of the change in share 
value) or the sunk recurrent cost of the targeted firm are large. The first condition implies 
that the large trading profits compensate for the reduction in profits in the product market 
The second condition implies that the target firm will exit the market if it is threatened with 
predation. First though I run through the standard model without outsider trading 
possibilities in order to allow comparisons.
A.l. Standard Strategic Complements Model
There are two firms, label them Firm A and Firm B, which sell a differentiated good, product 
A and product B. The degree of differentiation between the products is given by the 
parameter 8, 0 < 8 < 1 .1 £ 8 = 0  the demand for product A is independent of the demand for 
product B, and vice versa. As 8 increases the products' substitutability rises. The individual 
prices are given by the following linear inverse demand functions:
or 0 if qA+OqB >1
or Oif qB+ 0qA > 1
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To simplify each firm is assumed to have zero marginal costs of production. The two firms 
must pay a sunk cost in every period they produce. Let this equal F A for Firm A and Fg for 
Firm B.«
Proposition 17: In the standard model without outsider trading the profits of the two firms 
are the following:
4 (i+ 0 )(2  - e y  A
j7 -  ______ f
B ( l + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) 2 5
Proof: To analyse price setting behaviour we need to analyse the demand functions, a little 
manipulation of the inverse demand functions gives:
<!b  =
1 -0  
1- 0 2 
1 - 0  
i - e 1
P a , f y s
i-e2 1- 02
P b  I QPa
i-e2 \-o2
The maximisation function of Firm A is:
MaxpAqA- F i
Pa
which becomes:
M axpA ( \ - 0  p A t 0pB 
\ - 0 2 ~ \ - 0 2 1 - 0 - ) ~ F a
Thus the reaction function of Firm A is:
P a =
I assume that F A and Fg are less than 1 - 0
(1 + 0 X 2 - 0 ) 2
to ensure that both firms are initially in the market.
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A similar result is obtained for Firm B. Further manipulation of the reaction functions gives 
the following values for price and output:
1 -0
Pa ~ Pb ~ 2 -0
1
gA ~ q B ~ (l+ 0 )(2 - 0 )
A .Z  M odel W ith O utsider T rad ing
Since with strategic complements Firm A is no longer guaranteed higher profits from the 
predation strategy it is necessary to expand the structure of the model in order to integrate 
the initial decision of Firm A. All other aspects of the game remain the same as the original 
model with strategic substitutes. The time line of the expanded game, which is identical to 
the game with strategic substitutes except for the decision of Firm A in 1, is as follows:
Time Line
1. Firm A decides whether to take the short position and enact the predation strategy.
2. If Firm A has chosen to predate then Firm B learns about the predation strategy.
3. Firm B chooses to: a) pay the sunk cost F B and produce; or b) exit the market.
4. Production, collection of revenues and declaration of liquidating dividend.
5. Firm A closes its short position in Firm B.
We therefore have a three stage game. Stage 1 is the decision of Firm A to enact the 
predation strategy or not. Stage 2 is the decision of Firm B of whether it will pay the sunk 
cost and produce or exit the market. Stage 3 is the production game. The relevant solution 
concept is therefore subgame perfect equilibrium and I begin by solving Stage 3 first.
Proposition 18: If both firms compete in Stage 3 then, with the addition of outsider trading, 
the equilibrium profit levels are:
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n „  =
+ P t
2- e - e 1-p 0+po1 p92+9+pe+i
4 - 0 * + p 9 *  (0 + l ) ( 4 - 0 2 + j302)
1- 6» 2 -9 2-9  9 + 2
(1 + 9 ) { 2 - 0 Y  ( 4 - 9 2 + p 9 2) ( 4 - 9 2 + p 9 1)(9 + \) - F ,
(0+2)2( l - 0 )
‘  ( 4 - 0 2+ p e 2)2(9+i) ‘
Proof: The maximisation function of Firm A is
p ^ A + fi(Q + Q)(2 - 0 )2 Psq* l Fa
Substituting for the quantities and differentiating to obtain the reaction functions results in 
the following reaction function for Firm A:
_ 1— — f30p B
p * -------------- 1------------
and the reaction function of Firm B is
P b  =
l - 0  + fyA 
2
Simple manipulation of the reaction functions gives the equilibrium prices and quantities:
2 —0 2 - 6  
4 - 0 2 + fi0 2 
0 + 2
(0 + l ) (4 -0 2+pO2)
These values can then be plugged into the maximisation function to give the profit levels.«
Proposition 19: If Firm A is the only producer in Stage 3 then the profit levels are the 
following:
_ l - 0 2 + P02- P 0 - O  
Pa 4 - 0 2+ p 0 2
P02+0 + pO+2 
qA (0 + \){4-02+ p 0 2)
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n . = T +P(
\-e
(l + 0 )(2 - 0 ) ~ F b)
nB=o
Proof: If Firm B exits the market then Firm A acts as a monopolist, sets p A = 0.5 and obtains
the monopoly profits of 0 .25. Firm B exits the market so its share price is zero and the
trading profits are f  ).■
^v(i+0)(2-0)2
Proposition 20: Firm B will decide to pay the sunk cost and produce if
( e + 2)2(\ - 0) r J 7
( 4 - 0 2 + p 0 2)2(0 + 1) '
Proof: Firm B has the choice between two options. It can pay F B and produce or exit the
market. As is normal in game theory the player solves backwards. In this case Firm B will
calculate that its Stage 3 Nash equilibrium profits will be (0+2)2(l-g) , Only if this
6 ^ r  (4 -# 2 +/?02)2(0+l) '  J
value is bigger than zero will it decide to produce since its alternative is to exit the market
and obtain profits of zero. ■
Proposition: The following are sufficient conditions for Firm A to enact the predation 
strategy
(0 + 2)2( l - 0 )
( 4 - 0 2 + P 0 2) 2(0 + 1) *
or
p  - 4  + 7 ( 0 ‘ + 8 0 3 + 1 6 -4 0 *
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Proof: If (g+2):p - 0) then Firm A knows that Firm Two will exit the market. In this
{A-61 + 091Y{9 +1)
case Firm A will act as a monopolist. The profits Firm A earns are:
n ,A+P( i - 0
( i + 0 X2 - e y
t - F .- O )
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It is easy to show that
\ - e
( i + 0 ) ( i ~ e ) 2
.  1 - 9
> ( l + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) 2 -*
This completes the first part of the proof.
As w as shown in Proposition 18 if Firm B stays in the market then Firm B will obtain the 
following level of profits:
2- e - 02-P9+ pe2 fie2+e+fie+2 
4 -e 2+pe2 (9+\){4-e2+pe2)
1 - 9
(\ +  9 ) ( 2 - 0 ) 2
2 - 9 2 - 6 ____________9  + 2
( 4 - 0 2 + p 9 2) ( 4 - 9 2 + f l 9 2) (0  + 1)
This has to be compared to the profits that would be obtained if Firm A was not to enact the 
predation strategy which would be the following:
1 -0
( 1 + 0 X 2 - 0 )
The relevant inequality is therefore:
2 - e - e 2 - p e + p 9 2 p e 2 + e + p 9 + 2  
4 - 9 1 + p e l ie+ \ ){4 - e 2 + p 9 2)
1 - 9 ________ 2 - 0 2 - 9 __________9  + 2 > 1 - 0
+ ^ ( l + 0 X 2 - 0 ) 2 ( 4 - 0 1 + p e 2) ( 4 - 0 2 +PO2X0+1) > (l + 0 )(2 -< 9 )2
This simplifies to
- 0 3 +  PO2- P 26 2 + 4 9 —4p  < 0
The roots i and j  of the equation
- e l + p e 3 - p 2e 2 + 4 $ - i p = o
are:
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> - ^ - ( 0 3 - 4  + V(6, i + 8 0 3 + 1 6 - 4 0 s
2 0
Since p >  0 the relevant root is = —L(6>3- 4 + / ( ^ + 8 ( 9 3+16-4(9i * This, combined with the
20
fact that _^-(-03 +^ 3-y?262+45-4y?)<omeans ^ at necessary condition for Firm A to
increase its profits when Firm B stays in the market is q > _ L ( 0 3 _ 4 +J($f> +&$3 + i 6 -4 0 s • 
This completes the second part of the proof.«
3.5.1. Analysis and Comparative Statics
The results for a model with strategic complements differ from the results of a strategic 
substitutes model in a number of ways. The most significant difference is that it is no longer 
always optimal to enact the predation strategy. In this one period game Firm A will only 
engage in predation if at least one of two sufficient conditions is met. The first condition is 
(9+2?(i-$) If this condition holds then Firm A knows that Firm B will exit the
( 4 - 0 2 + +
market because it has relatively high sunk costs. Therefore Firm A enacts the predation 
strategy because it will be a monopolist. The other condition is that
0 . 1 _4+J(Q*+ g03 +16- 40* ■ this case ft is large so the trading profits are large. The large
p ie2K
trading profits are enough to offset the fall in the product market profits, thus the total 
profits of Firm A rise if it engages in the predation strategy. This contrasts with the results 
for a model with strategic substitutes, where Firm A will always engage in outsider trading 
and predation.
On the diagram below I use the reaction functions to explain what happens when Firm A 
uses outsider trading and a predation strategy.
Figure Nine -  Effect of Outsider Trading on Reaction Function
The original reaction functions are drawn for 6  -  0.5. As can be seen this leads to an 
equilibrium price of 0.3. With the addition of outsider trading the reaction function of Firm  
A rotates in an anticlockwise direction. The diagram above shows the reaction function for 
f i -  0.6. One can see that the new equilibrium is to the lower left of the original equilibrium 
points. The products are strategic complements so the best response to an aggressive action 
is an aggressive action. This joint price cut leads to a point where Firm A obtains smaller 
profits in the product market (as is shown in Proposition 22 below).
In terms of the animal taxonomies of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) the predation strategy 
makes Firm A tougher, as an increase in (3 reduces the profits of Firm B. In the case studied 
here Firm A is trying to induce the exit of Firm B. This is similar to the deterrence argument 
so the optimal strategy for Firm A is the Top Dog strategy. As was stated before, the main 
difference between the model with strategic substitutes and the model with strategic 
complements is that in the latter the predating firm obtains lower revenues in the product 
market. This is proved below.
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Proposition 22: With strategie complements the product market revenues of Firm A drop 
when it enacts the predation strategy.
Proof: The original revenues of Firm A were
1 -0
(l + 0 ) ( 2 - 0 ) 2
The new product market revenues of Firm A are
2-Q-e2-pe+po2 pe2+Q+pe+i
4 - e 2+ p e 2 (0 + i) (4 -0 2+>002)
The inequality that proclaims that the new profit levels are smaller is the following
1 - 0  2 - 0 - 0 2 - y ? 0 + / ? 0 2 p 0 2 + $  + pQ+ 2
(i+ 0 )(2 -0 )2 > 4 - B 2+ p e2 (0 + i)(4 -0 2+y?02)
This simplifies to the following condition on p
40-0'
P  2 0 2 - 4 - 0 '
Which is true if /? > 0 and 0 < 0  < 1 .■
3.5.2.2. Comparative Statics of p
i
The diagram below shows thè effect of a change in p.
Figure Ten - p  Comparative Statics
As can be seen, an increase in p  rotates the reaction curves anticlockwise. The diagram above
contains the reaction functions for p  -  0, p  = 0.3, P  -  0.6 and P =2.. The use of the predation
strategy leads to a reduction in price for both firms { ¿Pa. <Qand ¿Pb <0). In terms of
dp dp
quantities this leads to an increase in the output of Firm A (^Sj . > q) and a decrease in the
dp
output of Firm B ( ifoy < q ). The output of Firm B drops despite the price decrease because the 
dp
large drop in the price of product A shifts demand to product A. The combined effect of the 
changes in prices and outputs is that an increase in p  leads to a reduction in the product 
market profits of both Firm A and Firm B.
An increase in p  leads to an increase in the trading profits of Firm A. The sign of the 
derivative of the total profits (product market + trading profits) of Firm A w.r.t. p  is not able 
to be signed. This is because of the dual effect mentioned above: a larger P increases die 
trading profits but also reduces the product market profits.
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Another aspect which is affected by ¡3 is the cut-off level of sunk costs. As was shown earlier
if (fl+2)"(l-fl) -  then Firm B will exit the market. The diagram below shows the
( 4 - 0 2 + ft92)2(0+]) *
critical levels of sunk costs for differing levels of /?. The top line shows the critical level of 
sunk costs for ¡3=0, then the lower lines are ¡3 ~ 0.1, ¡3 = 0.5 and ¡3 -  0.9. One can see that on 
the diagram below the derivative of this condition with respect to /? is negative.
Figure Eleven -  Effect of ¡3 On Critical Fixed Costs Level
The most striking result is the almost negligible effect the outsider trading option has on 
Firm B. Even with /? = 0.9 there is very little chance of Firm B exiting the market. In order for 
Firm B to exit the market Fb would have to be between the top line and the bottom line. This 
is a very small area of the diagram so the chances of successfully predating the target out of 
the market are very low.
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3.5.2.2, Comparative Statics of $ ■ /
Figure Twelve - 6 Comparative Statics
The diagram above shows the effects of changing 6 when outsider trading is allowed. The 
diagram above shows the equilibria for p  -  0.3, and $ - 0 .5  and 0 - 0 .1 .  One can see that an
increase in $ leads to a decrease in price for both firms (¿Ea. < o and < o ). Again this is due
dd dO
to the competition effect. The effect on outputs are unsignable. This is because the individual 
price cuts have differing effects on the quantity demanded, so the net effect is unknown. The 
product market profits of Firm A decrease as 6  increases because the competition becomes 
fiercer. However, the effect on the trading profits is unsignable. The combined effect of these 
two factors is therefore uncertain and it is impossible to sign the derivative of total profits
with respect to 9. The derivative of the profits of Firm B is negative ( 5 1 l  <o), reflecting the
dO
fact that more substitutability leads to fiercer competition and lower profits.
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As was stated at the beginning of the Appendix one of the sufficient conditions for Finn A to 
enact the predation strategy is a sufficiently high J3- The exact condition is
P > —^-(03 - 4 + t](0*  + 8 0 3 + 1 6 - 4 0 5 and is graphed below. 
29
Figure Thirteen -  Interaction of 9  and ft
One can see that as 9  increases the critical level of /? increases. A higher degree of 
substitutability means that the gains from trading in the market have to be much larger. This 
is because an increasing 9 leads to lower product market profits when predating and 
therefore the trading profits have to be very large to ensure that the predation strategy is 
optimal.
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The cut-off level of sunk costs is also affected by 9. As was shown earlier, if
. (9 + 2)2(\~0) <p  then Firm B will exit the market. The diagram below shows the critical
( 4 - 0 2 + / ? 0 2) 2( 0  +  I) '
levels of sunk costs for differing levels of ft the top line shows, ft = 0.1, the middle line ft =0.5 
and the bottom line ft = 0.9. One can see that on the diagram below the derivative of this 
condition with respect to ft is negative. As ft increases the critical level of sunk costs falls. 
This is because an increasing ft denotes an increasing level of competition and therefore 
lower profits. With Firm B making lower profits it is easier to predate it out of the market.
Figure Fourteen -  Effect of ft on Critical Fixed Costs Level
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4. EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION AND COMPETITION LAW 
BREACHES
4.1. Introduction
The separation of ownership and control in large firms is an integral part of the modem  
economy. This classic principal-agent problem is usually ameliorated by the use of executive 
compensation contracts that aim to align the interests of executives and shareholders. 
Executive compensation and pay-performance relations have been studied at length and 
Murphy (1999) provides a summary. The incentives facing the CEO are important because/ 
given this split between ownership and control/ it is the executives of the firm that choose 
the firm's strategy and decide which sectors to invest in, how to finance the firm and, as 
studied here, whether to break the competition laws. Any firm breaking the UK competition 
laws ran the risk of being reprimanded by the competition authorities, and repeated 
breaches of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act (1976) led to company fines, personal fines 
and the threat of jail sentences. Breaking the law was therefore a risky strategy and risk 
averse executives would have desired some compensation for these risks. This is the main 
hypothesis tested in this paper.
Hypothesis One: that the executives in firms that broke the UK competition laws received 
higher remuneration, ceteris paribus.
This hypothesis is tested on an unbalanced matched sample that runs from 1977 to 1997. The 
sample compares executive compensation in the reprimanded firms during the ten years 
before they were reprimanded with executive compensation in a matched sample of firms 
that did not break the law.
Since I also have data on the reprimanded firms for the period after they were reprimanded 
I am  able to test a second, related, hypothesis. After the reprimand the reprimanded firms 
should not have been breaking the competition laws, so there should have been no extra 
compensation for the executives. This is hypothesis two.
Hypo thesis Two: after they were reprimanded, the firms that broke the UK competition 
laws paid equivalent remuneration to their executives, ceteris paribus.
8 1
The results of the pre-reprimand sample show that both total directors' remuneration and 
the remuneration of the highest paid director were significantly higher. These results 
support the hypothesis that when executives break the law they are compensated for the 
extra risk.
The results in the post-reprimand sample show that total remuneration of the board of 
directors was significantly higher, but highest director's salary was not significantly higher. 
The results for highest director's salary support the hypothesis, but the results for total 
board remuneration do not. Some potential explanations for these results are discussed in 
Section 6.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 details the hypotheses and describes 
competition law in the UK between 1977 and 1997. Section 3 describes the data collection 
process. Section 4 contains the results of the pre-reprimand analysis and Section 5 contains 
the results of post-reprimand analysis. Section 6 considers some alternative explanations for 
the results and Section 7 concludes.
4.2. Theory
In this section I lay out the theory behind the hypotheses and briefly describe UK 
competition law during the sample period.
4.2.1. The Expected Costs of Breaking the Law
This section discusses the expected costs an executive faced when deciding whether to break 
the UK competition laws between 1977 and 1997. I consider the differences between a 
standard investment project, e.g. opening a new factory, and deciding to break the 
competition laws e.g. joining a cartel. The upsides are very similar: the firm increases its 
profits. The difference lies in the downside risks. The downside risks can be split into two 
different types: personal fines or imprisonment, and reductions in the executive's future 
earnings.
Personal fines could only be imposed on the executives that repeatedly broke the Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act, an act that controlled agreements between firms. When a director 
attempted to enforce an agreement that the court had already annulled they were found
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guilty of contempt court and fined individually. This cost has no parallels in normal 
business projects. One could argue that these fines were only imposed after the second 
offence, and therefore there were no additional costs involved in breaking the law the first 
time. This is mistaken, as being caught once increases the probability of being fined in the 
future, even if this only through a mistake by the court.
The second cost of breaking the law is less direct, and involves the reputation of the 
executive. Any executive who has been delivering high profits will be well regarded by the 
owners of the firm, and the owners of other firms. These shareholders will base their 
valuation of the executives on many factors, but the shareholders will be unable to tell 
whether the executive is breaking the law. The shareholders will see the profit level, but will 
be unable to tell whether those profits are derived from illegal or legal actions by the 
executive. Since it is a possibility that the executive is breaking the law to deliver these 
profits this will be factored into the estimation of the value of the executive. The executive's 
value to the shareholders will be a weighted average of two values. The first value will be 
the value of the executive if he is acting legally, call it Vl. The second value will be the value 
of the executive if he is acting illegally, call this V/. Vj will be lower than Vl because the 
profits delivered are less likely to continue and the illegal actions may result fines in the 
future. If a  is the owners' estimate of the probability that the executive is acting legally the 
value of the executive will be given by the following formula:
Initial Value of Executive ~ccVL + (1 -  a)Vj
After an executive has been caught breaking the law the owners will update their beliefs and 
the value of a  will become zero, and the new value of the executive will be Vi. This is a fall 
in the value of the executive because Vi > V;. Since the owners now value the executive less 
highly he will receive lower remuneration. The possibility of this reduction in remuneration 
is a definite cost for the executive.
This fall in value will not occur if a normal investment project does not deliver higher 
profits, as no updating of the executive's value will occur. Therefore this fall in value is a 
cost solely associated with acting illegally.
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In sum, it is clear that there is some cost involved in breaking the law. All that remains is to 
show that the legal risk faced by executives were constant throughout the sample period of 
1977 to 1997. This is done below.
4.2.2. UK Competition Law
In 1976 the Restrictive Trade Practices Act (RTPA) became law. The Act introduced a system  
of compulsory registration and all agreements that met the criteria set out in the RTPA had 
to be registered with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). The OFT then assessed the 
agreements and the restrictions they entailed. When the OFT decided to challenge the 
restrictions it brought a case before the Restrictive Practices Court. If the Court decided that 
the agreements harmed consumers and provided no other compensatory benefits then the 
agreement was struck down, but no fines were imposed. Fines were only imposed if the 
parties repeated the offence. Repeated offences were deemed contempt of court and the 
court then had the power to fine the companies and the individual executives faced fines or 
imprisonment. The 1995 Annual Report of the Director General of Fair Trading gives an 
example of the court fining individuals:
"Record fines totalling £8,735,000 (plus costs) were imposed on the 
companies themselves, while five directors who were found to have aided 
and abetted the contempt were ordered to pay £87,500 in fines and costs. The 
other two directors were acquitted.... The judge made it clear that individuals 
who were found guilty of similar offences in the future should expect to go to 
prison for a significant period." (p.40).
The Fair Trading Act (FTA) of 1973 and the Competition Act of 1980 covered abuses of a 
dominant position. The Fair Trading Act dealt with anti-competitive practices or 'scale 
monopolies'. If the OFT or the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC and now the 
Competition Commission) thought the firm was acting anti-competitively then a lengthy 
investigation was launched. A t the end of this procedure the firm could only to be told to 
cease the actions. No fines could be imposed under the FTA or the Competition Act.
In addition to covering abuses by individual firms the FTA also sanctioned investigations of 
'complex monopolies'. These provisions allowed the MMC to investigate whole industries 
rather than firms - there was no need for a single firm to have a dominant position.
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Following investigation the MMC could only require the firms to cease the actions that the 
MMC deemed to be anti-competitive and again no fines could be imposed.
The FTA and the RTPA were in force throughout the sample period, from 1977 to 1997. The 
Competition Act became law in 1980 but had no effect on the penalties, it only changed the 
procedure and criteria for investigating dominant positions. In short, the legal risks faced by 
executives breaching the competition laws were almost constant between 1977 and 1997.
4.2.3. Relevant Literature
Asch and Seneca (1976) was the first paper to compare firms that broke the competition laws 
with those that did not. They tested a sample of firms that were involved in US cartels and 
found that the firms in the cartels were less profitable than comparison firms. Papers 
following the same path include Choi and Philippatos (1983) and Feinberg (1980).
The literature on executive compensation is vast. The basic empirical results are that 
executive compensation is closely linked to the size of the firm and that performance 
sensitivities are small but significant. Murphy (1999) provides a summary. UK papers 
analysing executive compensation include: Conyon (1997), Conyon and Leech (1993), 
Cony on and Murphy (2000), Conyon and Nicolitsas (1998), Cosh (1975), Cosh and Hughes 
(1997) and Gregg et al. (1993).
Cosh and Hughes (1997) is the paper that is closest to the current paper. Their paper 
examines the links between executive pay and institutional shareholdings. The authors find 
that the presence or absence of major institutional shareholders has no effect on the level of 
remuneration or the likelihood of dismissal.
4.3. Data
In this section I lay out the method used to form the sample of reprimanded and innocent 
companies. The primary aim of the selection methodology was to reduce the probability of 
Type I and Type II errors: the problem of incorrectly classifying innocent and reprimanded 
firms. This is very important in the area of competition law, as there are few 'bright lines' 
dividing legal from illegal practices.
1 1 1 1 4
The Annual Report of the Director General of Fair Trading gives a detailed description of the 
work of the OFT and the MMC during the year. I examined the reports from 1978 to 1999 
and collected the names of the companies that had been reprimanded by the OFT, the MMC, 
or the Restrictive Practices Court. These are the three types of reprimand I used as evidence 
of a breach of UK competition laws.
The first type of reprimand is a decision by the Restrictive Practices court. The Annual 
report of 1990, on p .l ll  states:
"On 30 November, the Restrictive Practices Court took action against 41 
companies which had been parties to 12 price fixing agreements in the glass 
manufacturing and glass distribution industries...Confirming that the 
agreements were against the public interest, the court accepted the 
undertakings from some of the companies not to enforce these price 
restrictions or to enter into similar agreements and made orders to the same 
effect against the remainder."
The second type of reprimand is a report by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. An  
example of this appears on p.39 of the 1994 report, which states:
"Following a report by the MMC in 1992, Bryant and May Ltd. gave 
undertakings to the Secretary of State giving effect to a freeze on the price of 
matches and prohibiting the inclusion - in future agreements with its 
customers - of provisions on discounts, exclusive sales, promotional activity 
and minimum stocking likely to strengthen its position and weaken that of its 
competitors."
The third type is a reference or report by the Director General of Fair Trading, an example of 
this is on p.87 of the 1984 Annual Report, which states
"The Director General has published a report under section 3 of the 
Competition Act 1980 (the Act) stating that a course of conduct pursued by 
Ford Motor Company Limited (Ford) constitutes an anti-competitive 
practice..."
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Collecting these types of reprimands between 1977 and 1997 led to a list of 268 
infringements. The fact that the actions of these companies were only deemed wrongful after 
a detailed investigation minimises the probability of a Type I error (the probability that these 
firms were acting legally and were mistakenly reprimanded by the authorities).
These 268 companies were then cross-referenced with the data available from Datastream. 
For each of the companies I attempted to obtain accounting data for the ten year period 
before the decision of the competition authority. Since many of the companies in the sample 
were subsidiaries of a non-UK corporation, or were not quoted, there was a notable 
reduction in the pre-reprimand sample size. I was able to obtain accounting data for 23 of 
the companies that were reprimanded. The first company I have data for is BPB (British 
Plasterboards). BPB was reprimanded in 1978 so I use data from 1977 to 1978. Dixons 
appears in the 1998 report but was reprimanded in 1997, so the Dixons data runs from 1988 
to 1997.
The comparison sample was built using the matching technique. For every reprimanded 
firm I obtained its industry grouping according to the Financial Times newspaper. I then 
compared the total sales of each reprimanded company with the total sales of the companies 
in the same industry grouping. The two firms whose sales were the closest to the 
reprimanded firm over the sample period were then chosen, and wherever possible I picked 
one firm with slightly larger sales and one firm with slightly smaller sales. A number of 
checks were then made on the chosen 'innocent1 firms.
First, I made sure that the comparison firm was not subject to any regulation of its activities 
or was recently privatised. Joskow, Rose and Shepard (1993) show that the level and 
structure of executive pay differs in regulated and non-regulated firms, at least in the US. 
Wolfram (1998) shows that the average level of chief executive remuneration in the twelve 
UK regional electricity distribution companies nearly tripled in the two years following 
privatisation. Since these effects could influence the results no regulated or recently 
privatised firms were included.
Second, all the matched firms were checked to see whether they had been involved in any 
illegal activity. The fear here is that a firm chosen as 'innocent1 may actually have been 
breaking the law but was never caught. In an attempt to prevent Type II errors (incorrectly 
classifying guilty firms as innocent firms) the following checks were carried out.
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1. All matched firms were cross-referenced to see if they appeared in the Annual 
Reports of the Director General of Fair Trading. If they were mentioned (apart from  
those who were cleared by merger investigations) they were rejected.
2. All matched firms were fed into the search engines of the Office of Fair Trading 
website, the Competition Commission website, Competition Directorate-General 
website, and the general UK government website. If these searches returned any 
malfeasance then the companies were rejected.
For every one of the comparison firms that was rejected I chose the next closest firm and 
repeated the above procedure. Unfortunately, for some of the companies I could find only 
one matching firm that fulfilled the above criteria. In addition, there were no matches for 
GEC-Marconi in the Information Technology Sector. I therefore chose its comparison firms 
from the Financial Times' Aerospace and Defence Sector.
A similar methodology was used for the post reprimand sample. The only differences were 
the following:
1. I used data for the period following the reprimand, up to the year 1999.
2. BPB w as dropped because it was reprimanded for a second time by the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission in 19901.
3. Empire Stores was removed from the sample because of its takeover by the 
Kingfisher Group.
4.4. Pre-Reprimand Analysis
This section covers the analysis of the pre-reprimand sample. First comes a description of 
the data. This is followed by a profitability analysis and then the executive compensation 
analysis.
1 "The Commission found that BPB's past conduct has not always stayed with the boundaries of fair competition." 
Director General of Fair Trading's Annual Report 1990, page 80.
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4.4.1. Summary Statistics
The table below contains the summary statistics for the data (all figures in thousands of UK 
1990 pounds). I represents the innocent firms and R the reprimanded firms.
Table 4.1
Pre-Reprimand Sample Summary Statistics I=Innocent, R=Reprimanded
Figure Mean Media Std. Dev Max Min Obs.
I- Total Assets 787,778 415,242 992,065 4,173,749 5,462 361
R- Total Assets 2,178,212 1,071,921 3,297,221 1.38X107 11316 164
I- Total Sales 1,042,366 444,052 1,331,675 6330,337 3,989 361
R-Total Sales 2,608,870 1,441,419 4,216,761 2.5ÛX107 20,924 164
I- Number of 11,171 5,865 14,702 71,319 90 251
Employees
R= Number of 25,255 10326 39,426 157,000 324 97
Employees
I-Total Fixed Assets 456,389 210,148 722,894 4,615,073 1,028 361
R- Total Fixed Assets 1,440,561 372,290 2,536,007 1.07xl07 4,700 164
I- Dir. Remuneration 913 686 856 5,649 79 361
R- Dir. 1,715 1,213 1,939 9,089 107 164
Remuneration
I- Highest 184 134 190 1,177 29 318
Remuneration
R- Highest 242 176 201 1,577 34 143
Remuneration
I-ROA (Adj.)(%) 5.36 5.59 3.45 13.74 -14.38 361
R-ROA (Adj.)(%) 6.76 5.96 4.65 22.50 -2.3 164
I- Trading Profit 8.01 7.07 6.61 44.55 -19.71 361
Margin (%)
R- Trading Profit 8.90 7.91 7.16 41.36 -1.62 164
Margin(%)
When the means are compared one can see that the reprimanded firms are larger in terms of 
total assets, total sales and number of employees. The mean sales for the reprimanded firms
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were £2.6 billion, while the sales of the innocent firms were £1 billion. The large differences 
in size were driven by problems encountered in the matching process. First, three of the 
reprimanded firms were in the Food Producers and Processors Group (Unilever, Hillsdown 
Holdings, and Cadbury-Schweppes). Since Tate and Lyle was fined 7 million ECU by die 
European Commission in 1998, and a subsidiary of Booker was fined by the UK  
Environmental Agency in 1998, both these firms could not be included in the list of innocent 
firms. The remaining firms in the Food Producers and Processors Group are much smaller 
than the reprimanded firms, thus contributing to the imbalance in size. Similarly, BASS is 
much larger than the other brewers in its group.
Dir. Remuneration is the remuneration of the whole board of directors and includes the  
salary, bonuses and pension contributions of all the board. The mean level of remuneration 
in the innocent firms was £913,000, while the level in the reprimanded firms was £1,715,000. 
The highest level of real remuneration in an innocent firm was £5.6 million. This was paid to 
the board of Marks and Spencer PLC in 1993. The highest real level of remuneration in a 
reprimanded firm, £9.1 million, was paid to the board of Unilever in 1978.
Highest Remuneration is the remuneration of the highest paid executive on the board and  
this is usually the Chief Executive Officer. This figure includes salary, pension contributions 
and bonus. The level of real mean pay in the innocent firms was £184,000, while in the 
reprimanded firms it was slightly higher at £242,000. The lowest paid executive worked for 
Williams in 1981 and was paid a real sum of £29,000. The highest paid executive of the 
sample of innocent firms was an executive of BOC in 1985, and received a real sum of £1.117  
million. The highest paid executive of a reprimanded firm, receiving a real sum of £1.577 
million, was on the board of Dixons in 1997. The year the then MMC released a report 
stating that the actions taken by Dixons 'operated or m ay be expected to operate against the 
public interest'.2
ROAADJ is measured as iQQx Adjusted Aftertax Profit. As can be seen, the mean figure for the
Total Assets
innocent firms is 5.36%, while the figure for the reprimanded firms is 6.76%. The higher 
profitability of the reprimanded firms also appears in the Trading Profit Margin figures of 3
3 Domestic electrical goods I: a report on the supply in the UK of televisions, video cassette recorders, hi-fi systems 
and camcorders by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Published 30.7.97.
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the two groups. The mean figure for the reprimanded firms is 8.90% while for the innocent 
firms it is 8.01%. These figures cure investigated in the next section.
4.4.2. Profitability
As a prelude to the main results I investigate in more depth the profitability figures 
discussed above. The intuitive belief is that firms that break the law do so to increase their 
profits. I therefore test whether this is true by estimating the following model:
ROAADJit = /?, + P2 {REPRIMANDED) , + fi3X t + p AYt + sit
Where X» is a set of dummies to control for industry fixed effects and Yt controls for year 
fixed effects. Reprimanded is a dichotomous variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm 
was reprimanded for breaking the competition laws and 0 if n o t The results are shown in 
the table below:
Table 4.2
Results of Profitability Analysis- Pre-Reprimand Sample
Variable Coef. Robust Std. Error3 t-stat
Constant 6.44 1.13 5.68
REPRIMANDED 1.48 0.34 4.38
Chemicals -0.75 0.66 -1.13
Construction -0.71 0.62 -1.14
EEE 0.95 0.78 1.22
Food Processors 0.77 0.55 1.40
General Retail 0.27 0.54 0.49
IT 2.20 0.72 3.04
Pharmaceuticals 4.62 1.00 4.64
Pubs & Brewing -0.15 0.64 -0.23
Steel -2.59 0.99 -2.61
Support Services 0.81 0.93 0.87
Dependent Variable: 100 * Adjusted After Tax Profit. R2=0.32, Obs. =525
Total Assets
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The constant represents the value for the transport industry. So the average firm in the 
transport sector that did not break the competition laws had a return on total assets of 
6.44%. The coefficient for reprimanded is positive and significant. The ROA of the 
reprimanded firms was, on average, (Liixioo) 23% higher than that of the innocent firms.
6.44
The other coefficients show the differences between the industries. The pharmaceuticals 
sector was the most profitable.
A similar regression was run with Pretax Profit Margin as the dependent variable, the  
results of this are given below:
Table 4.3
Results of Profitability Analysis- Pre-Reprimand Sample
Variable Coef. Robust Std. Error3 4 t-stat
Constant 15.07 3.23 4.66
REPRIMANDED 1.27 0.51 2.52
Chemicals -4.76 2.01 -2.36
Construction -5.19 2.00 -2.60
EEE -2.20 2.12 -1.04
Food Processors -7.21 1.93 -3.74
General Retail -6.03 1.99 -3.03
IT -1.12 2.13 -0.52
Pharmaceuticals 5.94 2.60 2.28
Pubs & Brewing 0.79 2.00 0.40
Steel -9.17 1.96 -4.66
Support Services -4.13 2.21 -1.87
Dependent Variable: Pretax Profit Margin, R2=0.32 Obs.=525
Again the results show that the reprimanded firms were significantly more profitable. The
Pretax Profit Margin of the reprimanded firms was approximately ( 127 - iqq) “  8% higher.
15.07
The results show that the average in the transport sector was 15.07%, while the figure in the
3 Calculation of robust standard error follows White (1980).
4 Calculation of robust standard error follows White (1980).
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steel sector was significantly lower at (15.07 -  9.17 -  5.90%). Again, according to this 
measure, the pharmaceuticals sector is the most profitable.
The results here contrast with Asch and Seneca (1976), who find that after controlling for 
other variables collusive behaviour is negatively associated with profitability. This 
difference may be because Asch and Seneca (1976) compared firms in cartels and those not 
in cartels. Here the sample contains firms that were abusing a dominant position. It could be 
argued that abusing a dominant position leads to significantly higher profitability. 
Therefore, given these higher profit levels, it is important that when we test the hypotheses 
on executive remuneration we control for profitability.
4.4.3. Executive Compensation
4.4.3.1. Individual Executive Remuneration
In this section I use Highest Director's Remuneration as the dependent variable. This proxy 
for executive remuneration includes salary and bonus but does not include the value of 
options or changes in the value of share holdings. Joskow and Rose (1994) report that 
bonuses are usually tied to accounting criteria, so I use accounting measures of profitability 
rather than share based measures of shareholder return in the following analysis.
Two major caveats should be borne in mind when interpreting the results that follow. First, 
m any US studies include the personal characteristics of the CEO, such as the length of 
tenure, the age of the executive, or the age of the executive squared as independent 
variables. Rose and Sheperd (1997), for example, include age at appointment, tenure as CEO, 
outside hire, and company founder as independent variables. To my knowledge the only 
UK study that contains this type of data is Conyon and Murphy (2000). Their UK data cover 
the 1997 fiscal year for 510 companies. In their study the coefficients for CEO age and CEO 
age squared are both significant. To the extent that these omitted variables are correlated 
with the error term in the model below the estimates presented below will be biased. The 
second caveat is that highest director's salary is not disclosed for some of the companies. If 
there is correlation between the level of the remuneration and the lack of willingness to 
disclose it the results below will again be biased. I
I estimate four equations based on the following structure:
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In (H D S)k - fit+ fit  In (SIZE) u +^(PRO FITA BILITY) it +  + fis Yt + fi6 {REPRIMANDED), + 1
In(HDS) is the natural log of Highest Director’s Remuneration. Size is measured either as
Total Assets or Total Sales. Profitability is measured either as 100 x Adjusted After Tax Profit Dr the
Total Assets
Pretax Profit Margin. X,- is a set of industry dummies and Yt controls for year fixed effects. 
Reprimanded is a dichotomous variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm w as  
reprimanded for breaking the competition laws and 0 if not.
Table 4.4
Results of Individual Executive Compensation Analysis -  Pre-Reprimand Sample
Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
ln(Total Assets) 0.268 0.270
(0.010) (0.011)
In (Total Sales) 0.264 0.265
(0.010) (0.010)
ROA(%) 0.028 0.027
(0.005) (0.005)
Pre-tax Profit 0.010 0.019
Margin(%) (0.003) (0.003)
Reprimanded 0.117 0.108 0.148 0.125
(0.038) (0.038) (0-039) (0.037)
R-Squared 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.78
Obs. 461 461 461 461
Dependent Variable: ln(Highest Director's Salary). Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
The results for size closely follow the literature. Rosen (1992) summarises a number of 
studies and reports pay-size elasticities between 0.2 and 0.35. Here the coefficient of 0.264 for 
total sales in the second regression means that a 10% rise in size will lead to a 2.64% rise in 
the remuneration of the highest paid executive. Evaluated at the means this implies that 
increasing sales from £1.531 billion to £1.684 billion would lead to an increase in 
remuneration from £202,122 to £207,458 an increase of £5,336. The ROA coefficient is also 
significant, showing that there is significant pay-performance sensitivity. The estimated
coefficient of 0.028 in the first regression means that increasing ROA by 5% (e.g. from 10% to 
10.5%) would lead to pay increasing by 0.14%. The coefficient for reprimanded is 
significantly different from zero, and shows that the executives in the reprimanded firms are 
paid between and 11.4% and 16% more, depending on the independent variables chosen.5
In general the regressions give remarkably similar results and thus we can be confident in 
drawing conclusions from the data. It is clear that the data support the hypothesis that the 
highest paid executives in firms that broke the law were rewarded for the extra risks they 
faced.6
4.43.2. Board Remuneration
In this section I use total board remuneration as the dependent variable. Although the 
majority of empirical papers use the remuneration of individual executives as the dependent 
variable I include total board remuneration for three main reasons.
First, as stated above, the results above for individual executives may be biased, either by 
the non-inclusion of individual CEO characteristics as independent variables, or because of 
non-disclosure of highest director's remuneration. With respect to the first problem, since 
the board contains a number of directors it is less likely that the personal characteristics of 
individual board members will have an effect on total board remuneration. There is 
therefore less chance that the estimates presented below are contaminated by omitted 
variable bias. With respect to the second problem total board remuneration is always 
disclosed so there is no non-disclosure bias.
Second, if the firm is breaking the law then many of the executives will have to be 
compensated for the risk.
I estimate the same econometric models as above but this time use total board remuneration 
as the dependent variable. The results are presented below:
5 Calculated as - 1
6 The sample above contains the guilty firms and those innocent firms that were matched in the 
pre-reprimand period. If instead we take the comparison firms that were matched over the post­
reprimand theory and use their data in the above regressions the estimated guilty coefficients 
were no longer significant. This is probably due to the poor match.
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Table 4.5
Results of Board Remuneration Analysis -  Pre-Reprimand Sample
Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
In(Total Assets) 0.430 0.436
(0.011) (0.011)
ln(TotaI Sales) 0.430 0.424
(0.012) (0.012)
ROA(%) 0.007 0.006
(0.005) (0.005)
Pre-tax Profit -0.002 0.136
Margin(%) (0.003) (0.003)
Reprimanded 0.140 0.124 0.148 0.121
(0.038) (0.040) (0.038) . (0.038)
R-Squared 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.84
Obs. 525 525 525 525
Dependent Variable: ln(Total Board Remuneration). Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
As before, the results from the different regressions are remarkably similar. The size of the 
firm is the driving factor, with profitability having a small and often insignificant effect. N o  
explanation can be given for the differences when Pre-tax Profit Margin is used as an  
independent variable. With regard to the hypothesis tested the estimated reprimanded 
coefficient is significantly different from zero in all the regressions and ranges from 0.121 to  
0.148, implying differences in total board remuneration of 12.9% to 15.0%. The data here 
support the hypothesis that executives are compensated for the risks involved in breaking 
the competition laws.
The significantly higher total board remuneration could be driven by two factors: either 
larger boards, or higher average board remuneration for the individual executives. Further 
regressions were run and the results of these showed that average board remuneration was 
positively and significantly related to the reprimanded dummy variable, but that board size 
was not related. Another potential problem is that the extra pay of the highest director's 
salary drives die results obtained for total board remuneration. To test this I created a new 
variable, which was the equal to
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Total Executives Remuneration - Highest Directors Salary 
Number of Executive minus 1
When the natural log of this variable was used as the dependent variable in the regressions 
above the reprimand coefficients were of a similar magnitude and significant In sum, the 
results support the hypothesis that all the executives on the board obtain premiums for the 
risks associated with breaking the competition laws.7
4.5. Post -  Reprimand Analysis
This section is concerned with the question of whether the executives in the firms that were 
reprimanded continued to receive higher remuneration after the reprimand. In this sample 
we assume that the previously reprimanded firms are no longer contravening the 
competition laws, so there should be no extra risks that require compensation. As before I 
begin with die summary statistics of the post reprimand sample.
4.5.2.1. Summary Statistics
The table below contains the summary statistics for the data (all figures in thousands of UK 
1990 pounds). I represents the innocent firms and R the previously reprimanded firms.
7 The sample above contains the guilty firms and those innocent firms that were matched in the 
pre-reprimand period. If instead we take the comparison firms that were matched over the post­
reprimand theory and use their data in the above regressions the estimated guilty coefficients 
were of a similar magnitude and significant.
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Table 4.6
Post Reprimand Sample Summary Statistics I=Innocent, R=Reprimanded
Figure Mean Media Std. Dev Max Min Obs.
I- Total Assets 1,050,605 551,312 1,407,110 6,720,069 9,754 306
R- Total Assets 3,440,408 2,075,590 3,940,948 1.78xl07 10,770 158
I- Total Sales 1,416,438 716,822 1,625,902 6,545,552 12,251 306
R-Total Sales 39,066,651 2,240,519 5,414,175 2.36xl07 18,395 158
I- Number of 13,833 8,357 18,182 73,689 147 132
Employees
R= Number of 32,815 12,356 41,036 145,346 219 68
Employees
I-Total Fixed Assets 561,767 273,399 843,442 4,128,458 5,948 306
R- Total Fixed Assets 2,177452 1,210,719 2,691,141 1.06xl07 7,488 158
I- Dir. Remuneration 1,460 1065 1,588 9,858 116 306
R-Dir. 2,250 1816 2,305 12,947 202 158
Remuneration
I- Highest 348 232 353 2,378 56 304
Remuneration
R- Highest 460 371 367 2,159 49 158
Remuneration
I-ROA(Adj.)(%) 5.56 5.94 5.27 17.45 -35.10 306
R-ROA(Adj.)(%) 7.00 6.88 4.48 19.91 -7.33 158
I- Trading Profit 7.03 6.22 7.25 46.25 -34.34 306
Margin (%)
R- Trading Profit 9.54 7.95 8.11 39.35 -6.04 156
Maigin(%)
As in the pre-reprimand sample the reprimanded firms are considerably larger in terms of 
total assets, total sales and number of employees. Again the imbalances in the Food  
Producers and Processors sector are the main reasons for this.
The mean of Directors' remuneration was higher in the previously reprimanded firms. The 
highest level of real remuneration in an innocent firm w as £9.858 million. This was paid to
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the board of Smith-Kline Beecham in 1996. The highest level of real total director 
remuneration was £12.947 million. The board of Glaxo earned this amount in 1993.
Highest Remuneration gives the sum of salary plus bonus for the highest paid director in a 
firm. The mean real remuneration in the innocent firms was £348,000, while in the 
reprimanded firms it was £460,000. The lowest paid highest paid executive worked for the 
construction company Alexander Russell in 1982 and was paid a real sum of £56,000. The 
highest paid executive in the sample of innocent firms was an executive of Smith-Kline 
Beecham, who received the real sum of £2.378 million in 1995. The lowest paid highest paid 
executive of a reprimanded firm worked for Gibbs and Dandy and was given a reed value of 
£49 000 in 1992. The highest paid executive in the reprimanded sample was an executive of 
Glaxo-Wellcome, who received £2.159 million in 1995.
ROAADJ is measured as 10° x Adjusted After Tax Profit can ^  seeil/ the mean figure for the
Total Assets
innocent firms is 5.56%, while the figure for the reprimanded firms is 7.00%. This shows that 
even after they were reprimanded for breaking the competition laws the reprimanded firms 
continued to be more profitable. The higher profitability of the reprimanded firms also 
appears in the Trading Profit Margin figures of the two samples. The mean figure for the 
reprimanded firms is 9.54% while for the innocent firms it is 7.03%. This figure of 9.54% is 
actually higher than the figure for the reprimanded firms when they were breaking the law 
(8.90%), showing that the reprimand had few negative effects on the profitability of these 
firms. This result is mirrored in the ROAADJ figures, before the reprimand the figure for the 
reprimanded firms was 6.76%, while after the reprimand the figure was 7.00%. These 
profitability figures are investigated in more depth in the next section.
4.5.2. Profitability
In this section I further investigate the profitability figures mentioned above. To test whether 
there are significant differences between the previously reprimanded firms and the matched 
firms I estimate the following model
ROAADJu = Px + P2 {REPRIMANDED) i + P3X t + ff4Yt + eit
99
Where X t is a set of dummies to control for industry fixed effects and Yt controls for year 
fixed effects. Reprimanded is a dichotomous variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm 
was reprimanded for breaking the competition laws before the sample period and 0 if it was 
not. The results were the following:
Table 4.7
Results of Profitability Analysis- Post-Reprimand Sample
Variable Coef. Robust Std. Error9 t-stat
Constant 2.65 0.76 3.48
REPRIMANDED 1.60 0.39 4.11
Chemicals 0.71 0.71 0.99
Construction -0.34 0.59 -0.59
EEE 0.19 0.63 0.31
Food Processors 1.12 0.54 2.06
General Retail 3.38 0.56 5.97
IT 3,40 0.74 4.57
Pharmaceuticals 4.78 1.71 2.79
Pubs & Brewing -0.32 0.58 -0.55
Steel -5.97 1.45 -4.09
Support Services 2.59 0.78 3.30
Dependent Variable: Adjusted After Tax Profit  ^R2=0.32 Obs.=464
Total Assets
The constant represents the value for the transport industry. So the average firm in the 
transport sector that did not break the competition laws had a return on total assets of 
2.65%. The coefficient for reprimanded is positive and significant. The ROA of the
reprimanded firms was, on average, (M ^ io o )“  approx 60% higher than that of the innocent
2.65
firms. This compares with the 23% that occurred before the firms were reprimanded. The 
other coefficients show the differences between the industries. Again the Pharmaceuticals 
sector is the most profitable. 8
8 Calculation of robust standard error follows White (1980).
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A similar regression was run with Pretax Profit Margin as the dependent variable, the 
results of this are given below:
Table 4.8
Results of Profitability Analysis- Post-Reprimand Sample
Variable Coef. Robust Std. Error9 t-stat
Constant 10.98 3.05 3.60
REPRIMANDED 2.66 0.58 4.58
Chemicals -5.22 2.93 -1.78
Construction -7.42 2.83 -2.62
EEE -5.07 2.85 -1.78
Food Processors -7.38 2.82 -2.61
General Retail -1.11 2.92 -0.38
rr -2.08 2.92 -0.71
Pharmaceuticals 5.39 4.17 1.29
Pubs & Brewing -2.65 2.90 -0.92
Steel -12.84 2.89 -4.46
Support Services -4.54 2.90 -1.56
Dependent Variable: Pretax Profit Margin, R2=0.35 Obs.=462
Again the results show that the reprimanded firms were significantly more profitable. The 
Pretax Profit Margin of the reprimanded firms was approximately 2,6^xi00cs 24% higher.10
The results here can be compared with those of Choi and Philippatos (1983). They find that 
in the US an antitrust indictment led to a reduction in the price cost margin and thus the 
profitability of the indicted firms, at least for those firms that were not inexperienced 
violators. For experienced firms, which they define as those firms that were indicted more 
than once in their sample period, they find that an indictment had no effect on the price cost 
margin and profitability.
9 Calculation of robust standard error follows White (1980).
10 The sample above contains the guilty firms and those innocent firms that were matched in the post-reprimand 
period. If instead we take the comparison firms that were matched over the pre-reprimand theory and use their 
data in the above regressions the estimated guilty coefficients were again significantly larger than zero.
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4 .53 . Executive Compensation
4.53.1 . Individual Executive Remuneration
I now move to the analysis of executive compensation and start with Highest Director’s 
Remuneration as the dependent variable. As stated before, one should keep in mind that 
there might be omitted variable bias.
I estimate
ln(tfA$)i( = A  + A  H SIZE)it + /?3 {PROFITABILITY), + PAX i + p sYt + J36 {REPRIMANDED), + e .
In{HDS) is the natural log of Highest Director's Remuneration. Size is measured either as
Total Assets or Total Sales. Profitability is measured either as 100 x AdJusted After Tax Profit or
Total Assets
the Pretax Profit Margin. X t is a set of industry dummies and Y* controls for year fixed 
effects. Reprimanded is a dichotomous variable that takes on the value 1 if the firm was 
reprimanded for breaking the competition laws and 0 if not.
The results of the various equations are laid out below:
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Table 4.9
Results of Individual Executive Compensation Analysis - Post-Reprimand Sample
Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
InfTotal Assets) 0.328 0.327
(0.160) (0.01)
In (Total Sales) 0.318 0.316
(0.016) (0.016)
ROA(%) 0.019 0.015
(0.006) (0.005)
Pre-tax Profit 0.008 0.017
Margin(%) (0.003) (0.004)
Reprimanded 0.015 0.071 0.027 0.050
(0.040) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
R-Squared 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.77
Obs. 462 462 460 460
Dependent Variable: In (Highest Director's Salary). Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
The results above show that there was no significant link between the remuneration of the 
highest paid executive and whether the firm was previously reprimanded for breaking the 
competition laws. The reprimanded coefficient is not significant in any of the regressions.11 
These results support Hypothesis Two. The firms are no longer breaking the law, so there is 
no extra risk that requires compensation.
4.5.3.2. Board Remuneration
In this section I use total board remuneration as the dependent variable. As was previously 
stated, the results in this section should be more reliable due to two factors. First, total board 
remuneration is less likely to be affected by the individual characteristics of the board 
members so omitted variable bias is likely to be less severe. Second, total board 
remuneration is reported for all the years and all the companies, so there will be no bias due 
to non-disclosure. *
The sample above contains the guilty firms and those innocent films that were matched in the post-reprimand 
period. If instead we take the comparison firms that were matched over the pre-reprimand theory and use their 
data in the above regressions the estimated guilty coefficients were also not significantly different from zero.
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Table 4.10
Results of Board Remuneration Analysis - Post-Reprimand Sample
Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
ln(Total Assets) 0.451 0.458
(0.013) (0.014)
ln(Total Sales) 0.441 0.437
(0.013) (0.012)
ROA(%) 0.017 0.011
(0.004) (0.004)
Pre-tax Profit 0.003 0.016
Margin(%) (0.003) (0.004)
Reprimanded 0.117 0.190 0.133 0.170
(0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
R-Squared 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.81
Obs. 464 464 462 462
Dependent Variable: ln(Total Board Remuneration). Robust Standard Errors in parentheses.
With total board remuneration as the dependent variable the results are very different. In all 
four of the regressions the reprimanded coefficient is significant and positive. The estimated 
coefficients range from 0.117 to 0.190. This implies remuneration differences of between 12%  
and 21%.12
The other coefficients are as one expects: the size of the firm is the driving factor, with 
profitability having a small effect. These results reject Hypothesis Two. The board of 
executives was no longer breaking the law, so there should have been no need for higher 
remuneration.
Further analysis was carried out on the remuneration of the board of directors. The natural 
log of average board remuneration was used as the dependent variable in regressions 
similar to those above. The coefficient for reprimanded was significant and the coefficients 
were, in the same order as the regressions above, 0.102, 0.139,0.120 and 0.133, implying that
12 The sample above contains the guilty firms and those innocent firms that were matched in the post-reprimand 
period. If instead we take the comparison firms that were matched over the pre-reprimand theory and use their 
data in the above regressions the estimated guilty coefficients were of a similar magnitude and significantly 
different from zero.
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average board remuneration in the previously reprimanded firms was between 11% and 
15% higher. I also investigated the size of the board and the proportion of non-executive 
directors. There were no significant links between these two variables and whether the firm 
was reprimanded.
4.6. Alternative Explanations
The regressions on the pre-reprimand sample strongly support the hypotheses. Even after 
controlling for the higher profitability the executives in the reprimanded firms still receive 
higher remuneration. The post-reprimand sample results are less encouraging. Although the 
results show that the highest paid directors did not receive higher remuneration after the 
reprimand, total board remuneration was significantly higher. Below I study some 
alternative explanations for these results.
Having a dominant position in a market certainly makes it easier for a firm to break the 
competition laws. Therefore, having a dominant position could be related to breaking the 
law. However, it is difficult to see, if profitability is controlled for, why this would lead to 
higher remuneration for the executives.
A more plausible explanation is the lack of monitoring by shareholders. The descriptive 
statistics showed that the firms in the reprimanded sample were larger than the firms in the 
innocent sample. It could be that these larger firms, due to more dispersed shareholdings, 
were more affected by the public action problem. This gives the executives in these larger 
firms more scope to extract higher wages and, possibly, more opportunities to break the law. 
Cosh and Hughes (1997) investigate a similar theme and test whether the presence of 
institutions holding large proportions of shares affects executive compensation or the 
possibility of dismissal the UK. They find that institutional presence has no effects. The 
results of Cosh and Hughes contrast with those of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000). They 
study the effect of large shareholdings on executive compensation in a sample of US oil 
firms. They find that in those firms with more closely held equity the CEOs were rewarded 
less for exogenous factors that caused increases in share prices, in this case increases in the 
price of crude oil. These results support the view that dispersed shareholdings may allow 
executives to extract excessive pay, but give no indication as to whether dispersed 
shareholding provides executives with more scope to break the law.
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Another possibility is that although the shareholders cannot condition remuneration on the  
actions of the executives they m ay be able to condition on the type of the executives. Som e  
executives may have a reputation for choosing strategies that are close to being defined as  
illegal. If these aggressive executives deliver higher expected profits/ and there is a lim ited  
supply of them, then they will be paid more than other, standard, executives. The existence 
of these aggressive managers could be causal for both the higher remuneration and the  
breaches of competition policy. In order to test this one would have to obtain the names o f  
the individual directors and then associate them with the breaches of the competition law s. 
Unfortunately, however, the names of the highest paid executives are not available o n  
Datastream.
Principal-Agent theory gives unclear predictions about the relationship between executive  
remuneration and breaches of the competition laws. This is mainly because the predictions 
depend on the type of Principal-Agent model chosen On the one hand one could use a  
model along the lines of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). They show that if the executives 
have an exponential utility function, disturbances follow a Brownian motion, and the cost o f  
control is monetary then a linear reward scheme is optimal. This suggests that executive 
remuneration should vary linearly with profits. However, in this model the principal can  
only contract upon outcomes, not actions. Therefore, since breaking the law is an action  
there would be no scope for rewarding the executives. This model predicts that the  
coefficient of the reprimanded variable in the above executive compensation models should 
be insignificantly different from zero. On the other hand the principal agent model could be  
composed of two components, a linear contract that increases remuneration as profits 
increase, and a bonus for obtaining exceptionally high profits, profits which can only be 
obtained through breaking the law. This type of model predicts that the coefficient of the 
reprimanded variable in the above executive compensation models should be significantly 
different from zero. In this case causality would run from the compensation scheme to the 
executive breaking the law.
Finally, perhaps the most convincing explanation could be that the firms that were 
reprimanded continued to break the competition laws in the post-reprimand sample but 
were never caught by the authorities. This would explain the higher profits and the higher 
remuneration. However, no evidence exists to support this argument, it is merely 
speculation.
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4.7. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to investigate the links between competition policy breaches and 
the remuneration of UK executives. Breaking the competition laws imposes costs on the 
executives that are higher than the standard costs involved in managing a firm. I test to see 
whether executives are compensated for this risk.
The results showed that the executives of the law breaking firms were paid a significant 
premium in the pre-reprimand sample, ranging from 11% to 16% for the highest paid 
executive and from 13% to 15% for total board remuneration. The results for the pre- 
reprimand sample strongly support our hypotheses. Breaching the competition laws is risky 
and the executives are compensated for this extra risk.
In the post reprimand sample total board remuneration in the previously reprimanded firms 
remained significantly higher (differences of 12-21%), while there were no differences 
between the remuneration levels of the highest paid executives. The post-reprimand sample 
results only partly support our hypotheses. Possible alternative explanations for the higher 
remuneration include a lack of shareholder control in the law breaching firms, or the 
possibility that the firms continued to break the law but were never caught.
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